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Social Movements as Constituent Power:
The Italian Struggle for the Conmons
SAKI BAILEY* & UGO MATTEI*
ABSTRACT
The Italian commons (beni comuni) movement is a powerful example
of the way in which social movements are emerging as the new pouvoir
constituant serving not only to enforce the protections and guarantees of
national constitutions but also, in the context of the declining power of
the nation-state, as a counter hegemonic force against the neoliberal
economic constitutionalism of the international economic institutions.
The common goods social movement in Italy was born out of the
concerted action of a number of civil society groups combatting neoliberal
privatizations. This commons movement, as will be argued in this paper,
is an instance of one of the many struggles taking place throughout the
world; from the Bolivian Andes to the Indian Himalayas, where local
people are pushing out the state and predatory multinationals, and
resisting the collusion of state and market actors to enclose common
spaces and resources. These individual struggles for the commons are
emerging as a transnational social movement challenging the top-down
economic constitutionalism of the World Trade Organization (WTO), and
in the context of Europe what has been dubbed the "troika" of the
European Central Bank, the European Commission, and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF). Part I argues that social
movements are giving new life and meaning to the concept of popular
sovereignty by challenging the assumptions underpinning the liberal
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constitutional form, namely of private property, and providing a much
needed channel for political confrontation where parliamentary politics
has failed to protect the public from predatory private actors. Part II
offers a participant observation exploring the national constituent role
played by the beni comuni social movement in upholding the protections
and guarantees of the Italian Constitution. Finally, Part III attempts to
describe the global commons movement as engaged in a form of
bottom-up constitutionalism an emerging form of pouvoir constituant in
a supranational constituent process of reclaiming commons from
predatory multinational actors through bottom-up societal
constitutionalism.
INTRODUCTION
In the aftermath of the June 2011 Italian National Referendum
opposing the compulsory privatization of public utilities, the collection of
profits on tap water, and the creation of a nuclear program, a
constitutional moment' has been unfolding in Italy. The referendum
prompted a political clash of a constitutional nature between the
neoliberal state and the people, united through a social movement
under the banner of the beni comuni (common goods). In the Italian
context, the notion of common goods as a fundamental human right has
become a potent political strategy for reclaiming common goods like
water, culture, and education, subjecting them to constitutional
protections, and protecting their access and distribution through moral
communities. 2 This commons movement, as will be argued in this paper,
is an instance of one of the many struggles taking place throughout the
world where local people are resisting the enclosure of common
resources for private profit. These individual struggles for the commons
are emerging as a transnational social movement, challenging the
economic constitutionalism of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and
international financial institutions, and in the European context what
has been dubbed the "troika": the European Central Bank, the
European Commission, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
The common goods movement in Italy was the product of the
concerted action of a number of civil society groups combating neoliberal
privatization: the work of scholars at the Accademia dei Lincei (the most
prestigious research institute in Italy) who drafted proposed civil code
1. See generally 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE (1991) (discussing the theory of
"constitutional moments").
2. Saki Bailey, The Architecture of Commons Legal Institutions for Future Generations
in FUTURE GENERATIONS & COMMONS, Council of Europe Trends in Social Cohesion Series
(Saki Bailey, Farrell, G. & Ugo Mattei eds.) (forthcoming fall 2013).
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reforms to protect common goods; the work of lawyers undertaking an
impressive range of activities, from fighting against privatization in
courts-both on the constitutional and municipal levels-to assisting
communities to organize into legal associations like foundations (in the
case of national theaters) to prevent privatization; the work of activists
within the water forum who rallied public support for the referendum;
and finally the important work accomplished by citizens and local
communities reclaiming-as commons-nature, culture, labor, and
education from collusive corporate and state actors.
The success of this movement was demonstrated by the unexpected
victory of the "Water Referendum," where in an unprecedented manner
over twenty-seven million (the absolute majority of the voting
population) Italians turned out to vote with over 95 percent voting
against privatization, accomplishing the first 50 percent quorum in Italy
in over sixteen years.3 This major victory produced a counter reaction by
a neoliberal power elite fearful of popular revolt, leading to
modifications of provisions of the Constitution of 1948, approved with a
large majority vote by a delegitimized Parliament in order to prevent
another popular referendum from taking place in the future.4 As a
result, a major clash between representative and direct democracy has
been taking place in Italy, which led to the occupation of squares, as in
Greece and Spain, but also the occupation of actual sites of commons
enclosures, such as the Teatro Valle national theater and the high speed
train development project in the Susa Valley through the Italian Alp
Region.5
In July 2012, the ongoing struggle was settled by the Constitutional
Court in a landmark decision that shielded referendum results beyond
the reach of Parliamentary legislation,6 thus offering a major
constitutional source of legitimacy to the beni comuni movement. Since
the Water Referendum results, the former Government, deemed
3. MINISTERO DELL'INTERNO, SERVIZI ELETTORALI: REFERENDUM (June 12, 2011) (It.)
[hereinafter REFERENDUM], available at http://elezionistorico.interno.it/index.php?tpel=
F&dtel=12/06/2011&tpa=Y&tpe=A&ev0=0&1evsut0-0&es=S&ms=S (showing that almost
55% of Italians, more than 27 million people, went to the polling station, where 95% of voters
chose to vote "yes" to abolish the decree).
4. According to the Italian Constitution, if both chambers of Parliament in two
subsequent votes pass a Constitutional amendment with more than 2/3 majority, the
referendum to approve the amendment is precluded. Art. 138 Costituzione [Cost.] (It.). See
Ugo Mattei, Materials for a Subversive Constitutionalism, 46 GENRE 155 (2013).
5. See Against the Day, The Commons Movement in Italy, 112 S. ATLANTIC Q. 366
(2013) (Saki Bailey ed.).
6. See Corte Cost., 40, 17 luglio 2012, n. 199, http://www.cortecostituzionale.it/action
IndiciAnnuali.do (set "Anno" to "2012" and set "Mese" to "Luglio;" then follow "Visualizza"
button and scroll to "S. 199/2012") (It.).
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untrustworthy by the European neoliberal establishment,7 was forced to
resign in November 2011. A "technical" government, headed by a former
European Competition Commissioner, Mario Monti, was formed to carry
out the neoliberal policy mandate of the troika. While never elected by
the people, the government enjoyed an overwhelming economic
emergency based majority in the Parliament.8 When elections were
finally called in March 2013, the Italian electors overwhelmingly voted
against the technical Government with Mario Monti receiving a low 10
percent of the vote. Nevertheless, the very same large emergency-based
"grosse-Koalition" majority has been kept in office under the
premiership of a secondary figure of the Italian political landscape, the
young and well-connected centrist Enrico Letta. This solution, oblivious
of the will of the large majority of the Italians, was facilitated by the
re-confirmation of President of the Republic, Giorgio Napolitano, whose
modified highly proactive role in the shaping of the government
demonstrates the drastic nature of the Constitutional transformation
that has taken place in Italy.9 These dramatic events serve as a clear
example of the marginalization of popular sovereignty in the current
phase of global capitalism as a result of the rising power of international
financial institutions, and thus poses significant questions as to the
meaning of state sovereignty and the status of constituent power today.
The Italian beni comuni movement is not only a powerful example of
the way in which social movements are emerging as an important form
of constituent power at the level of the nation-state, but also at the
supranational level to limit the power of transnational actors in the
absence of a transnational form of representative government. In this
context, social movements serve not only to enforce by protest, physical,
and legal action the protections and guarantees of national
constitutions, but also to act as a counter hegemonic force against the
economic constitutionalism imposed by international economic
institutions.
7. Michel Rose, Trichet's Letter to Rome Published, Urged Cuts, REUTERS (Sept. 29,
2011 5:07 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/29/us-italy-ecb-idUSTRE78S4MK2
0110929; David Marsh, Moment of Truth for Mario Draghi, Market Watch, WALL STREET
JOURNAL (Mar. 11, 2013 6:00 AM) http://www.marketwatch.com/story/moment-of-truth-
for-mario-draghi-2013-03-11; Italian Water Movement Forces Monti to Respect the Results
of the Referendum, EUROPEAN FEDERATION OF PUBLIC SERVICE UNIONS, http://www.epsu.
org/a/8403 (last visited Sept. 15, 2013).
8. Elisabetta Povoledo, Monti Wins Broad Support in Parliament, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
18, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/19/world/europe/mario-monti-wins-broad-supp
ort-in-parliament.html.
9. Ugo Mattei, Bipolarismo Sincronico [Bipolar Synchonicity], 2 J. ALFABETA 30
(Luglio 2013) (it.)
968
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AS CONSTITUENT POWER
This paper is divided into three parts: Part I argues that social
movements are emerging as an important form of constituent power by:
(1) enforcing weakened constitutional public interest protections, (2)
challenging the assumption of private property underpinning the liberal
constitutional form, and (3) providing a much needed alternative
channel for politics where representative government and state politics
have failed to protect the public from predatory private actors. Part II
provides a specific case for this evolving role of social movements
through a participant observation by Ugo Mattei, one of the authors.1 0
This section explores the national constituent role played by the beni
comuni social movement in upholding the public interests protections
and guarantees of the Italian Constitution. Finally, Part III discusses
the emerging supranational constitutional process, analyzing the beni
comuni movement as part of a transnational social movement that
challenges from below the top-down imposition of global economic
constitutionalism by reclaiming the "commons" through a process of
bottom-up "societal" constitutionalism.
I. THE PARADOX OF CONSTITUENT POWER
The role of social movements in enforcing the constitution and
acting as a form of "constituent power" is by all means an
unconventional and even controversial claim. Classical constitutional
theory designates the capacity of constituent power to the people
through the concept of popular sovereignty; however, it is assumed by
these scholars that such constituent power is only legitimately exercised
through representative democracy." There is an inherent paradox in
this designation, which has perplexed constitutional theory from its
origins. The paradox is often referred to as the problem of the
"non-foundational foundations of law,"12 and may explain the traditional
10. Part II is the product of two years of full-time political and legal activism where
one of the authors (Ugo Mattei) played a nationally-recognized role in the beni cornuni
movement as lawyer, scholar, and activist.
11. There is a long debate on the controversy stretching from Hobbes, Rousseau,
Hume, Bentham, Burke, to name a few, and most recently Hardt and Negri, with the
concept of "multitude." See generally MICHAEL HARDT & ANTONIO NEGRI, MULTITUDE
(2004) [hereinafter HARDT, MULTITUDE] (discussing the concept of "multitude," a network
in which all differences can be expressed freely so that all can work and live in common).
See also MICHAEL HARDT & ANTONIO NEGRI, COMMONWEALTH (2009) [hereinafter HARDT,
COMMONWEALTH] (arguing a democracy of the multitude is possible by learning the art of
self-rule and transitioning to democratic forms of social organization).
12. Gunther Teubner, Societal Constitutionalism: Alternatives to State-Centred
Constitutional Theory?, in TRANsNATIoNAL GOVERNANCE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM 3, 16
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exclusion of civil society actors as "constituent power" in constitutional
theory. This problem of the "non-foundational foundations of law"
appeared in legal theory during the shift from natural law to positivism,
which produced a kind of chicken-egg problem for constitutionalism:
what came first, the constitution or the state? Constituent power or the
constitution? How can the state produce constitutional law when it is
the constitution itself that produces the state? What segments of
society-forms of political and civil organization-are included in this
category of the "people" and what is the "state" prior to the making of
the social contract, which itself designates and constitutes their political
status? Ruth Buchanan describes the paradox of social contract as the
product of a myth that positivists have accepted as a concrete reality.
A constitution is essentially an originary narrative, in
that it offers an account of the source of both legal and
political authority. It does so by purporting to ground
that authority in the political will of a "people"
understood to be capable of acting as a unified entity.
The "people," however, cannot come into existence as
such until after the founding inaugurated by the
constitution. The constitutional "moment," then, is
always a type of "pious fiction."13
As Buchanan explains, "the people" are a product of the constitution
itself, a unified political entity constituted by the constitutional form,
not something that has an a priori status. The paradox of the
constitutional narrative is that "[t]he origin has to 'be' before and after
the point of origination." 4 Hardt and Negri most recently critiqued the
disempowering consequences of such a myth, arguing that the
designation of a unified political entity of the "people" is instrumental to
the nullification of the pre-political subjectivity of the "Multitude" and
the conflation of the popular political will as the will of the sovereign;
robbing the "Multitude" of their ongoing constituent role in the
constitutional process.
Hobbes challenges the existence of the multitude on
more directly political grounds. The multitude is not a
(Christian Joerges et al. eds., 2004). See generally GUNTHER TEUBNER, CONSTITUTIONAL
FRAGMENTS: SOCIETAL CONSTITUTIONALISM AND GLOBALIZATION (2012).
13. Ruth Buchanan, Legitimating Global Trade Governance: Constitutional and Legal
Pluralist Approaches, 57 N. IR. LEGAL Q. 654, 658 (2006).
14. Peter Fitzpatrick, Breaking the Unity of the World: Savage Sources and Feminine
Law, 19 AUSTL. FEMINIST L.J. 47, 48 (2003).
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political body, he maintains, and for it to become
political it must become a people, which is defined by its
unity of will and action. The many, in other words, must
be reduced to one, thereby negating the essence of the
multitude itself: "When the multitude is united into a
body politic, and thereby are a people .. . and their wills
virtually in the sovereign, there the rights and demands
of the particulars do cease; and he or they that have the
sovereign power, doth for them all demand and vindicate
under the name of his, that which before they called in
the plural, theirs.15
The paradox of "social contract" that results from negating all
claims and existence of the Multitude, is that the "social" contract
becomes a contract of the sovereign with himself, effectively leaving the
sovereign free to pursue his own interests while maintaining the
appearance of representing popular sovereignty. But who or what really
is the Multitude, and who or what really is the sovereign? There is an
entire field of scholarship, which we will not attempt to synthesize, on
the nature of the entity we understand as the sovereign: from monarch,
to the third estate, to the modern state and the shifting raison d'dtat,
from pastoralism to neoliberal governmentality. 16 However, for our
purposes, we will focus on the concept of who or what forms of social and
political organization are understood to be included in the concept of the
Multitude today.
James Tully describes the Multitude as an "unformed constituent
power" capable of bringing back "the condition of possibility of the
modern idea of popular sovereignty."17 The Multitude is the pre-political
form of "the people," whose constituent power was obliterated for the
purpose of safeguarding property rights.18
15. HARDT, COMMONWEALTH, supra note 11, at 42.
16. See generally MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE BIRTH OF BIOPOLITICS (Michel Senellart ed.,
Graham Burchell trans., 2008) (collecting Foucault's lectures from his seminar course in
1978-79, focusing on the theme of biopolitics); MICHEL FOUCAULT, SECURITY, TERRITORY,
POPULATION (Michel Senellart ed., Graham Burchell trans., 2007) (collecting Foucault's
lectures from his seminar course in 1977-78, studying the "genesis of a political knowledge
that put the notion of population and the mechanisms for ensuring its regulation at the
center of its concerns").
17. James Tully, The Imperialism of Modern Constitutional Democracy, in THE
PARADOX OF CONSTITUTIONALISM: CONSTITUENT POWER AND CONSTITUTIONAL FORM 315,
320 (Martin Loughlin & Neil Walker eds., 2008).
18. See text accompanying note 11, supra.
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In the course of the great bourgeois revolutions of the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the concept of the
multitude is wiped out from the political and legal
vocabulary, and by means of this erasure the conception
of republic (res publica rather than res communis) comes
to be narrowly defined as an instrument to affirm and
safeguard property.'9
The very constitutional process from the Multitude to the political
"people" to res publica is an operation functional to maintaining a
prefigured distribution of property, legitimized by the idea of "popular
sovereignty." Tully goes further and argues that the modern liberal
constitutional form itself, which constituted the "republic" and
"representative democracy," was functional to the efficient continuation
of the hegemonic colonization of non-European people through the
destruction of communual property rights for the indigenous and their
conversion into private property rights for the colonizers. He describes
two fundamental "antagonistic imperatives" in modern liberal
constitutionalism, one imperative is that the consent of "the people"
must somehow be obtained (the idea of popular sovereignty), and the
other is that "governmental power must be divided, constrained and
exercised through distinctive institutional forms."20 One such institution
is that of private property. As Tully explains, these two imperatives pull
in opposite directions and the tension has become more acute in modern
constitutions, where the development of the constitutional framework
has undergone a process of institutionalization into highly complex and
autonomous forms. 21 Tully refers to this institutional autonomy as
"disembeddedness,"22 a defining feature of the modern constitutions,
where the structure of law has an independent status from "the
activities of those who are subject to it" and thus has the power to
19. HARDT, COMMONWEALTH, supra note 11, at 50.
20. Tully, supra note 17, at 317.
21. See id. at 317-19. This notion of "secondary rules" (a concept of H.L.A. Hart) as the
defining characteristic of constitutional forms is utilized not only in describing the
constitutions of nation-states but also beyond the nation-state, for example, in the theory
of Gunther Teubner's societal constitutionalism. See Teubner, supra note 12, at 16.
22. Tully, supra note 17, at 318. Many scholars consider this "disembedded" quality the
primary differentiating characteristic between western modern constitutions, considered
as "formal," from nonwestern indigenous constitutional forms, considered "customary,"
where the separation between the constitutional form, customary laws and norms is
collapsed. Id. It is this very distinction which led to the conclusion by colonial powers that
the colonies, prior to western conquest, were essentially lawless. This rhetoric also
persists within the "development" packages of the IMF and World Bank in the third
world, which bundle neoliberal reform together with the "rule of law" and "human rights."
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"constitute the field of recognition and interaction of the people subject
to it."23 Thus, the "disembedded" and "autonomous" quality of modern
constitutionalism facilitates a prefigured set of private-as opposed to
public or commons-property relations, which are not only defended by
the substantive law, but also rather underpin the entire constitutional
form. This effectively renders the institution of property invisible: it
constitutes constituents--and constituent power-within the limits of
individual private property relations, thus placing private
property-and the resulting unjust distribution of wealth-beyond
contestation and beyond the reach of constituents, in a neutralized,
constitutionally-produced political sphere.
Additionally, the inability of constituents to contest the private
property relations structured by the constitution and its bias towards its
protection and expansion results in the inability of constitutional law to
provide a shield to the takeover of the public sector by predatory private
actors. The result being not only to reinforce existing property
distributions, but also to effectuate massive transfers of public and
common wealth into private hands-as is taking place currently with
neoliberal privatizations. Today, intensified by the global economic
crisis and austerity measures, governments of modern liberal states
under the state of emergency act like the absolute sovereign monarchs
of feudal times, transferring to the private sector anything that it
desires, as if it were a private owner to serve the interests and profits of
corporations. 24
In this post-crisis landscape, the very distinction between the public
and the private sectors is becoming all but senseless, as visible in so
many versions of revolving doors and conflicts of interest that reveal the
blatant collusion between state actors and the global ruling 6lite who
profit from privatizations. Increasingly we are witnessing a return to a
sort of neo-medievalism, where state sovereignty is weak and
constitutional law is reduced to a Leviathan that uses an iron fist with
the weak-the peopleand the velvet glove with the strong-corporate
powers. Meanwhile, the Leviathan is at the mercy of transnational
corporate power and its role is reduced to enclosing the commons by a
continuous process of privatization of its own sovereignty. In sum, while
constitutional law can operate to defend the private sector against the
public sector (due process of law and just compensation clause are
examples), it cannot seem to defend the public sector against the private
23. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
24. Ugo Mattei, Emergency Based Predatory Capitalism: The Rule of Law, Alternative
Dispute Resolution, and Development, in CONTEMPORARY STATES OF EMERGENCY: THE
POLITICS OF MILITARY AND HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTIONS 89 (Didier Fassin & Mariella
Pandolfi, eds., 2010).
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one.25 Today, privatization is possible outside of any constitutional limit
or judicial review because states and governments are too weak to
impose a legal order over economic forces and private economic actors.
Rather than ruling the economy, governments are ruled by economic
power through a variety of capture phenomena and by the operation of
various ideological apparatuses, including legal academia. 26
In this context, what role can constituents play to rectify the current
disequilibrium between the public and private sectors given the
inherently flawed structure of the liberal constitutional form? How can
the Multitude reassert popular sovereignty when representative
government fails to protect the public from the private sector? Tully
presents four theses, explored by Martin Loughlin and Neil Walker,
about the ongoing constituent relationship between the people and the
constitution.
[W]hen the people subject to a constitutional form see
themselves as a multitude (an as yet unorganized and
unrecognized potential agent) behind the whole
constitutional-constituent formation and strive to
exercise all [political, labor, and security/police]
constituent powers together, overthrow the regime and
bring into being a new kind of constitutional formation,
which in turn must be subject to ongoing constituent
transformation (so the multitude remains sovereign over
the constitutional form to which it subjects itself). 27
This thesis, called "radical sovereignty," suggests that the
pre-political Multitude, by an act of radical sovereignty, or revolution,
can overthrow the constitution. The question remains, however, when is
an act of revolution by the Multitude truly in the name of the Multitude,
and when is it an act of cutting the constitutional restraints of the
Ulysses' bind and heeding the sirens' call for mob rule. While there is
clearly danger in treading beyond the limits of the liberal constitutional
form, however, given its flaws outlined above, it seems clear that we
must expand our notion of constituent power beyond the formalistic
25. See Ugo Mattei, Beni Comuni: Un Manifesto, Laterza, Roma-Bari (2011) (it.).
26. See Ugo Mattei, The Rise and Fall of Law and Economics: An Essay for Judge
Guido Calabresi, 64 MD. L. REV. 220, 241 (2005); see also UGO MATTEI & LAURA NADER,
PLUNDER: WHEN THE RULE OF LAW IS ILLEGAL (2008) (comparing the role of the rule of law
in violent extraction, or plunder, by strong international actors against weaker ones).
27. Tully, supra note 17, at 326.
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"juridical containment" definition. 28 Returning to the question of what
forms of social and political organization characterize the Multitude:
can we interpret the Multitude, the pre-political form of the people, as
politically active citizenry? Can politically active people, autonomous
and free from the liberal constitutional form, renew constituent power
and the idea of popular sovereignty? Is the solution to fight the private
with the private where the public has failed? Today, we are witnessing a
new wave of social movements organizing to defend public access to
common goods against privatization. Are these social movements
playing a constituent role? Are social movements the new pouvoir
constituent?
A. Social Movements as Constituent Power: Constituent Power without a
Constitution
Social movements have a long history of catalyzing change, not only
by exerting pressure on politicians, but also on courts, resulting at times
in major shifts in law.2 9 Consider the influence of civil rights activists in
the United States on the Warren Court which produced Brown v. Board of
Education,30 or the Friendly Settlement, which resulted in the U'wa
indigenous people's case against Occidental before the Inter-American
Human Rights Commission.31 These cases highlight the important role
civil society can play, not only in influencing courts, but also in
negotiating directly with multinationals themselves in the face of
today's weakening Leviathan. Social movements may offer a new pouvoir
constituant, providing alternative channels for pursuing justice where
states have failed. Many scholars are optimistic that a project for
"democratic constitutionalism," as opposed to the imperial project of
"constitutional democracy,"32 is underway and point to nonimperial
28. See id. (explaining the juridical containment thesis as stating that "the constitution
founds and structures the exercise of constituent powers, as in modern liberal theories of
constitutional democracy").
29. See generally ACKERMAN, supra note 1 (describing various "constitutional
moments" taking place in four periods of U.S. history, often outside of regular
constitutional procedures).
30. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social
Movements on Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062,
2086-96 (2002) (highlighting the contributions of groups like the NAACP, ACLU, and
SCLC).
31. See Summary of U'wa Indigenous Community/Precautionary Measures,
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Case No. 11.754, ESCR-NET,
http://www.escr-net.org/docs/il414389 (last visited Apr. 3, 2013).
32. See Tully, supra note 17, at 337. Tully suggests that the modern liberal
constitutional form is inherently imperial, with property and contract being assumed, and
operating "secondary rules," which structure and establish the distributive stakes
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forms of global networking-transnational social movements
challenging from below the imperial power of international
organizations and multinationals imposed from above.
All over the world, citizens have worked to elect social
democratic and workers' parties, only to watch them
plead impotence in the face of market forces and IMF
dictates. In these conditions, modern activists are not so
naive as to believe change will come from electoral
politics. That's why they are more interested in
challenging the structures that make democracy
toothless, like the IMF's structural adjustment policies,
the WTO's ability to override national sovereignty,
corrupt campaign financing, and so on.33
As people increasingly witness the dominance of international
economic institutions over states, they are losing faith in the power of
the state as a forum for transformative politics and are increasingly
turning to the power of social movements and the strategy of directly
confronting the very structure that renders democracy meaningless; the
invisible rules and unaccountable institutions operating at the
transnational level which have the power to affect distributions of
wealth at local levels. The role of social movements, largely ignored by
legal scholars, 34 are playing two important functions in the context of
involved, thus functional to the low cost and efficient continuing colonization of
non-European people.
33. Naomi Klein, Reclaiming the Commons, 9 NEw LEFT REV. 81, 86 (2001).
34. See Balakrishnan Rajagopal, International Law and Social Movements: Challenges
of Theorizing Resistance, 41 COLuM. J. TRANSNATL L. 397, 401 (2003). Rajagopal argues
that social movements are not only sources of international law but that they challenge
liberal categories of rights (and by extension constitutionalism) and the assumption that
legitimate power can only be exercised through recognized political forums. Id. at 401-06.
Rajagopal points to several reasons why social movements may have been largely ignored
by international law scholars, what he identifies as jurocentrism, an institutionalist bias,
and elitism. Id. Jurocentrism here is the tendency for lawyers to focus on textual analysis
of law emerging from legislatures and courts, which prevents the inclusion of text of
resistance or analysis of "illegal" interpretative acts by individuals which may go against
the very text of the law. Id. at 401-02. The institutionalist bias refers to the way in which
scholars tend to focus on the state as the major source of law and legal institutions, a
narrow conception of the "social" as unified and controlled by the agent of the state. Id. at
402-03. Finally, Rajagopal points to the elitist blind spots of international law, given that
"most Third World social movements consist of the urban poor, peasants, workers in the
informal sector, illiterate women, and indigenous peoples whose resources are being
destroyed." Id. at 406. It is for the very reason that subaltern subjects tend to be already
voiceless within their own nations, excluded from traditional political forums, that they
join social movements in the first place. See id. at 403-05. Ignored and excluded from the
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the decline of the nation state: (1) they are liberating the concept of
politics from the liberal constitutional form, which in turn is extending
the concept of constituent power beyond representative politics; and (2)
they are filling a crucial vacuum where representative politics have
failed, offering alternative channels for political engagement. Social
movements are expanding our understanding of politics as something
more than a set of actions taken in formal political arenas. They are
redefining "what counts as political and who defines what is political," 35
thereby reclaiming popular sovereignty and exposing the hidden and
unjust assumptions and prefigured distributions of liberal
constitutionalism.
Balakrishnan Rajagopal identifies three waves of social movements:
the first wave is characterized by organization around the "nation,"
referring to the national liberation projects of the third world which
took place in the 1950s and 1960s; the second wave concerns identity,
referring to the civil rights, feminist, and gay rights movements which
stretch from the 1960s into the 1990s; and finally, the third wave of
"antiglobalization" movements which erupted in the 1990s as a reaction
against capitalism, and highlighted the struggle over global resources.
It is within this third wave that we locate the social movement of the
commons, characterized as the struggle of local communities to reclaim
access and governance to common resources from collusive state and
market actors.36 Protest movements, in the form of local resistance
against privatization, are taking place throughout the world from the
Global South to the heart of the West. 37
Naomi Klein describes these movements as "reclaiming the
commons" and fighting against the negative effects of economic
globalization as united through their opposition to what has been
identified as a common enemy. "Thanks to the sheer imperialist
ambition of the corporate project at this moment in history-the
boundless drive for profit. . . -multinationals have grown so blindingly
traditional political forums, it is no surprise that they are also largely ignored by legal
scholarship. See id.
35. Id. at 416. See generally BALAKRISHNAN RAJAGOPAL, INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM
BELOW: DEVELOPMENT, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THIRD WORLD RESISTANCE (2003)
(analyzing this point by describing the way in which social movements are enacting a
"cultural politics" offering alternative conceptions of rights and identities). Similarly, Sally
Engle Merry analyzes the way in which NGOS and local organizations play a role in
indigenizing and "vernacularizing" transnational norms into local settings thus producing
new forms of political activism and subjectivity. See Sally Engle Merry, Transnational
Human Rights and Local Activism: Mapping the Middle, 108 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 38, 38
(2006).
36. See RAJAGOPAL, supra note 35, at 237-39.
37. See Klein, supra note 33.
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rich, so vast in their holdings, so global in their reach, that they have
created our coalitions for us."38 United against corporate power, the
commons movement is forming networks of activists in the fight to
protect common resources.39 Commons social movements are demanding
that property relations are exposed to political contestation in the public
sphere through the political process, but-primarily in the Global
South-they are also demanding through the political process that the
state respect existing traditional communal forms of property. 40 This is
very similar to the aims of the antiglobalization movement, and in many
ways the name, "antiglobalization" has never been accurate, as the
movement does not fight to suppress globalization, but rather seeks to
ensure that "the people who live on the land benefit directly from its
development."41
Social movements of local communities, reclaiming their autonomy
through collective ownership over common resources, not only challenge
the logic of private property assumed by liberal constitutionalism, but
also the role of the modern state in development. "As one Indian
minister said upon being confronted with a local dam-building effort by
farmers in the Krishna River valley using local, small-scale technology:
'If peasants build dams, then what will the state have left to do?' 42
Rajagopal goes on to cite numerous examples of communities in
India engaged in self-rule of collective lands and resources: from the
panchayat raj amendments to the "tribal Gram Sabhas."43 These
communities organizing themselves into social movements are not only
challenging the state but the very concept of development as the domain
of the state, and instead compelling recognition of local ownership and
communal forms of property. These social movements, however, are not
necessarily pursuing autonomy from the state, but rather, from the logic
of private property. In many cases, the state and traditional public
politics prove to be important arenas and sources of support for social
movements. The social movements' "attitude is often strategic,
contingent and opportunistic towards institutions of the state-they
constrain or work with whichever institutions happens to show more
38. Id. at 84.
39. Id.
40. "The personal is political," a slogan reflecting the feminist critique of fundamental
and human rights, takes the position that rights, which are primarily based on political
and civil rights, often exclude subjects like women governed by the private sphere (family
and property law) from the political "public sphere." See, e.g., J. Oloka-Onyango & Sylvia
Tamale, "The Personal is Political," or Why Women's Rights are Indeed Human Rights: An
African Perspective on International Feminism, 17 HUM. RTs. Q. 691 (1995).
41. Id. at 88.
42. RAJAGOPAL, supra note 35, at 265.
43. Id. at 265-66 (stating that the tribal Gram Sabhas are local village councils).
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support for their interests at any given time."44 It is this "strategic,
contingent and opportunistic" attitude of social movements, which
reinforces their autonomy and in turn their constituent potential by
engaging with constitutional guarantees of protecting the public
interest in access to certain fundamental resources but autonomous
from the constraints of the constitutional form. This autonomy provides
the freedom for social movements to engage in politics, utilizing
nontraditional methods and nontraditional forums, such as protests,
occupations, transnational networks, and most interestingly-as will be
explored in the final section-alternative institutions of governance.
These alternative forums for "doing politics" outside the state have in
many cases proven more effective for regulating predatory private
actors than state regulation.45 Increasingly, we are witnessing cases
where the state is being sidelined where representative democracy has
failed and local communities are directly negotiating with predatory
private actors, strategically using both private and public tools and
forums, as will be explored in the Italian case of the beni comuni. Many
scholars argue that "one of the key political developments of recent
times has been the direct engagement between social movements
operating in transnational mode and the major players in the global
economy." 46
Gavin Anderson makes a very strong case for the successfulness of
direct engagement through the example of the conflict between the U'wa
community and Occidental over Amazonian oil resources in Columbia.
In this case, the U'wa indigenous people were able to bypass the
corrupted state and national politicians by building a transnational
campaign that ended in a Friendly Settlement directly with the
multinational corporation before the Inter-American Commission of
Human Rights, successfully terminating Occidental's drilling rights in
the U'wa's land. 4 7 Such cases demonstrate that the resource warS48 have
taken a transnational and subaltern turn. In the face of a weakening
Leviathan overtaken by powerful corporate actors, it is the Multitude of
civil society actors that are proving themselves capable of battling
corporate "pirates" in the private channels of free markets, beyond the
regulation of the nation-state, for control of crucial resources like water
44. Id. at 256.
45. See Gavin W. Anderson, Societal Constitutionalism, Social Movements, and
Constitutionalism From Below, 20 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 881 (2013). See also Klein
supra note 33; Rajagopal supra note 34.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See generally MICHAEL T. KLARE, RESOURCE WARS: THE NEW LANDSCAPE OF
GLOBAL CONFLICT (First Owl Books 2002) (2001) (discussing the growing impact of
resource scarcity on the military policies of nations).
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and energy. Social movements, unbound by the limits of the state and
its constitutional form, offer alternative political strategies and forums
in the vacuum created by a weakening Leviathan, and serve to
revitalize constituent power without a textual constitution on the
transnational level to reassert the constituent role of the people on the
national constitutional level-as will be explored in Part III of this
paper.
To give a thick practical substance to these theoretical premises, we
will now analyze the constituent role played by the Italian beni comuni
social movement through a "participant observation." The beni comuni
movement, as the constituent struggle for the commons, is a good
example of a constituent struggle between social movements, the state,
and corporate forces. In this next section we will explore how the beni
comuni movement invoked, indirectly and directly, the constitutional
protections of the public and commons described below. Many of these
actions pointed directly to constitutional text available in a number of
highly advanced and mostly unimplemented provisions of the 1948
Constitution, most fundamentally in Article 3 and Article 42. Through
these actions the beni comuni movement is exposing the contradictions of
the state-private property dualism that colonized the modern
constitutional imagination, restoring the democratic constitutional
fabric and constituent role of the Multitude.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL & CONSTITUENT ROLE OF THE ITALIAN BENI COMUNI
This section describes the referendum campaign and formation of
the beni comuni as a social movement in the Italian national context, as
well as the oppositional neoliberal forces that organized against it. A
diverse array of actors (scholars, lawyers, activists, and politicians)
produced the complex scenario of struggle for the commons. The beni
comuni movement used legal (litigation), illegal (occupation) and other
political tools to advance an opposition to neoliberalism. The movement
utilized a strategy that was fully responsive to the complex and highly
pluralistic nature of the law in the contemporary scenario to
successfully reclaim the commons from neoliberal privatization. The
legal and political actions of the beni comuni movement reinvigorated the
constitutional debate in two ways: first, by bringing the "economic
constitution" within the Italian Constitution to life, reopening the
debate about what ought to be the space for the "public" and the
constituent role of the people in the constitution; and second, by
preventing, through a successful constitutional challenge, the attempt
by the neoliberal majority in Parliament to ignore the referendum
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result, thereby establishing the will of the people as having a higher
constitutional value than the will of Parliament.49
A. Background of the Italian "Economic Constitution" & Constituent
Role of the Beni Comuni
In Italy, the constituent claim of the commons movement is rooted
in the constitution's purpose of defending the people against abuses of
power. The idea behind the movement's claim is that the most
fundamental constitutional reform that one could promote in Italy today
is the implementation of the current constitution, especially Articles 3,
42, and 43, rather than drafting. new provisions-which would be
illegitimate given the current lack of parliamentary representativeness.
The current electoral law, though deemed unconstitutional by the
Consitutional Court and discussed for years in the Italian political
debate, was never replaced, thus shedding a sinister light on the
legitimacy of the current Parliament. Article 3 goes beyond the
bourgeois liberal model by making it a "duty" of the Republic to remove
the social and economic obstacles that de facto make it impossible for
everyone to participate in the political life of the country. 0 Article 42,
while considering private and public property on the same level
("[p]roperty is public or private") requires the law to protect private
property only as far as it is "accessible to all" and serves a "social
function."5 1 Article 43 gives constitutional recognition to "communities
of workers and users" in the governance of strategic public interest
resources. Similar social language is shared by many constitutions of the
twentieth century,52 but the political effort to implement this vision-
through a gradual process of limitation of social inequality-has been
49. Mattei, supra note 9.
50. Art. 3 Costituzione [Cost.] (It.) ("All citizens have equal social dignity and are equal
before the law, without distinction of sex, race, language, religion, political opinion,
personal and social conditions. It is the duty of the Republic to remove those obstacles of
an economic or social nature which constrain the freedom and equality of citizens, thereby
impeding the full development of the human person and the effective participation of all
workers in the political, economic and social organization of the country.").
51. Id. art. 42 ("Property is public or private. Economic assets may belong to the State,
to public bodies or to private persons. Private property is recognised and guaranteed by
the law, which prescribes the ways it is acquired, enjoyed and its limitations so as to
ensure its social function and make it accessible to all. In the cases provided for by the law
and with provisions for compensation, private property may be expropriated for reasons of
general interest. The law establishes the regulations and limits of legitimate and
testamentary inheritance and the rights of the State in matters of inheritance.").
52. See generally Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought:
1850-2000, in THE NEW LAW AND EcoNOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAIsAL 19
(David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006).
981
INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 20:2
discontinued since the so-called Reagan-Thatcher revolution. Here, the
background of the relevant economic provisions of the Italian
Constitution, which the beni comuni movement brought to life, are
presented.
The Italian Constitution of 1948 was the product of a constituent
process in which, for the first time, women could also participate. It is
usually described as a great compromise between the three cultural
components represented by the political parties that freed the country
from Nazi occupation and fascist rule: the socialists and communists,
the Catholics, and the liberals. 53 In fact, the Yalta agreements placed
Italy firmly within the capitalist block. The very powerful Communist
party, in Italy always functional in maintaining a capitalist status quo,
was to be formally "compensated for a missed revolution with a
promised one," to use the sarcastic description of Piero Calamandrei. 54
More recent scholarship has argued that the Italian Constitutional text,
rather than being a coherent compromise of merits, was a clever move
to table the discussion of the most heated issues by postponing them to
future political struggles.55 There were two technical tools deployed to
implement this truce: first was the broad delegation of authority to the
formal (ordinary) law to define the limits of economic activity (the so
called "riserva di legge"); and second were trade union negotiations,
supported by the constitutional right of strike, which were seen as a
wait-and-see strategy functional to the interests of all the political
parties represented in the Assembly.56 As a consequence, while the
Constitution emphatically sides with labor in its struggle against
capital, (particularly in Article 1), the actual text of what is usually
known as the "economic constitution" is much more ambiguous and
clearly divided in zones of cultural and political influence.
In particular, Article 41, the brain-child of the liberals and heavily
influenced by the conservative economist Luigi Einaudi, later to become
the first Italian President of the Republic, guarantees free enterprise,
which can only be limited by the law in the interest of human health,
53. See generally SONDRA Z. KOFF & STEPHEN P. KOFF, ITALY: FROM THE FIRST TO THE
SECOND REPUBLIC (2000) (providing the historical background of the development of
Italian politics and the transition between the First and Second Republics).
54. See PAUL GINSBORG, STORIA D'ITALIA DAL DOPOGUERRA A OGGI (1989) (It.). See also
Mario Comba, Constitutional Law, in INTRODUCTION TO ITALIAN LAW 31 (Jeffrey S. Lena
& Ugo Mattei eds., 2002). Piero Calamandrei was a liberal champion, a founding father,
and a famous scholar of civil procedure, later to become the first Chief Justice of the
Constitutional Court.
55. See generally STEFANO RODOTA, IL TERRIBLE DIRITTO (1981) (It.).
56. See GINSBORG, supra note 54.
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safety, and dignity.5 7 Article 42 contains a clear protection of private
property, which includes the traditional just compensation clause, only
limited by the notion of the "social function of private property"
borrowed from the European debate of the early twentieth century, and
previously rejected in the drafting of the civil code.58 This article,
especially dear to the social Catholics (Giuseppe Dossetti), avoided
taking a position on the "property question" in the Constitutional
Assembly by referring it to ordinary law.59 Article 4360 gives
constitutional recognition to the major role that factory councils in the
Northern industrial triangle (Turin, Milan, Genova) played in the
liberation struggle; and by reserving certain strategic assets to
"communities of workers and users," it can be seen as the "promised
revolution"-with a just compensation guarantee!-that the cynical
leader of the Communist party, Palmiro Togliatti, used to pacify his
constituency so that it respected Stalin's desires at Yalta. Significantly,
this Article, the constitutional basis of any nationalization policy, was
practically dormant through the life of the 1948 Constitution and only
very recently came to new life, being deployed as a Constitutional base
for action by both the occupation movement generated by the
referendum on the commons and the attempts to grant direct
participation of the people in the administration of the utilities system,
which took place in Naples.61 Finally, Article 9, strictly connected to
property law, has also remained dormant for many years but is now
playing a very significant role in the attack on current neoliberal
policies. This Article gives protection to cultural property and the
"landscape," a notion incrementally interpreted as "the environment,"
and offers a powerful constitutional argument for a critique of the logic
of exploitation of nature that characterizes the current order. Its
introduction into the Italian Constitution was due to Concetto Marchesi,
57. Art. 41 Costituzione [Cost.] (It.) ("Private economic enterprise is free. It may not be
carried out against the common good or in such a manner that could damage safety,
liberty and human dignity. The law shall provide for appropriate programmes and
controls so that public and private-sector economic activity may be oriented and
co-ordinated for social purposes.").
58. See RODOTA, supra note 55.
59. See GINSBORG, supra note 54.
60. Art. 43 Costituzione [Cost.] (It.) ("For the purposes of the common good, the law
may establish that an enterprise or a category thereof be, through a pre-emptive decision
or compulsory purchase authority with provision of compensation, reserved to the
Government, a public agency, a workers' or users' association, provided that such
enterprise operates in the field of essential public services, energy sources or monopolies
and are of general public interest.").
61. See Alberto Lucarelli, Commento all'art. 43 della Costituzione, in 1 COMMENTARIO
ALLA COSTITUZIONE 883 (Raffaele Bifulco et al. eds., 2006) (It.).
983
INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 20:2
a leading classicist and Communist representative in the Constitutional
convention.
Within the same logic of tabling the issues, as no party knew which
would eventually be in the minority, the Italian Constitutional system
rejected any "winner takes all" logic. The very same power was vested in
the two Chambers; the Prime Minister was seen as a primus inter pares,
the President of the Republic given a mostly formal super partes role of
representation (something similar to that of the President in Germany
or Israel or to the Monarchy in Great Britain or Spain), and the core of
the democratic struggle was intended for the political parties, where
citizens could participate in the democratic life of the country.62 Parties
were formally kept as "private organizations," and their leaders were
endorsed with shining credibility and a large level of deserved prestige,
due to the role they were able to play in clandestine organizations and
later administrative authorities in the progressively liberated areas of
the country. The idea was that the more representative democracy is
trusted, the less direct citizen's participatory democracy is needed.
Consequently, in the Italian constitutional scheme, direct democracy
was maintained in a very minor form. The Referendum takes only two
forms: first, the abrogation referendum of Article 75 of the
Constitution, 63 which can be requested by half a million voters that wish
to abolish a formal statute not connected with taxation, budget,
amnesty, pardon, or ratification of an international treaty; and second, a
confirmation referendum can be requested by the same number of
citizens if a constitutional change is introduced by Parliament. 64 This
possibility is not available if the change is passed in both Chambers
with a two-thirds majority.6 5 While the confirmation referendum has no
quorum, the abrogation referendum requires a turnout of half the
electorate to validly abolish a law.6 6
62. See Art. 49 Costituzione [Cost.] (It.) ("Any citizen has the right to freely establish
parties to contribute to determining national policies through democratic processes.").
63. Id. Art. 75 ("A general referendum may be held to repeal, in whole or in part, a law
or a measure having the [sic] force of law, when so requested by five hundred thousand
voters or five Regional Councils. No referendum may be held on a law regulating taxes,
the budget, amnesty or pardon, or a law ratifying an international treaty. Any citizen
entitled to vote for the Chamber of deputies has the right to vote in a referendum. The
referendum shall be considered to have been carried if the majority of those eligible has
voted and a majority of valid votes has been achieved.").
64. See Art. 138 [Cost.] (It.) Said laws are submitted to a popular referendum when,
within three months of their publication, such request is made by one-fifth of the members
of a House or five hundred thousand voters or five Regional Council.
65. Id. "A referendum shall not be held if the law has been approved in the second
voting by each of the Houses by a majority of two-thirds of the members."
66. Id.
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In the last two decades, the "economic constitution" described above,
primarily Articles 3 and 42, was transformed by privatization, and the
development of the idea of the "regulatory state" replaced that of
"entrepreneur state," which intellectually justified the dismantling of
the welfare system in the name of competition and efficiency.67 The
formal constitution was transformed in 2001 to decentralize the system,
enlarging the power of the regions, but the fundamental idea of the
social state was never openly challenged until recently. The targets of
the constituent attack to the text of the 1948 constitution began with
the last shot of the Berlusconi Government. In the process of drafting
the Ferragosto Decree, Berlusconi blamed the Italian crisis on Article 41
of the Constitution-as we remember, the brainchild of conservative
liberals such as Einaudi and De Nicola-which states that free
enterprise cannot be carried on in conflict with social utility or in a way
that damages human security, dignity, and freedom and that it reserves
to the law (again the technique of tabling the issues) to determine the
program and the appropriate controls so that public and private
economic activity can be aimed and coordinated to reach social
purposes.68 The position of the Berlusconi Government, carried on in full
continuity by Monti and by the current Government, was that the ex ante
model of administrative control, typical of the civil law tradition, was to
be replaced by a system of ex post facto redress on the tort law model
found in Article 1 of the U.S. Constitution. The Ferragosto Decree
emphatically stated that, within the necessary time to change Article 41
of the Italian Constitution, all that is not expressly prohibited to the
enterprise is now legal.69 This unedited style of constitutional reform by
decree was deemed constitutionally unacceptable by the Constitutional
Court in decision 199/2012, originated by the beni comuni movement
and discussed below.
The discussion on the formal reform of the economic constitution
was thus officially inaugurated in a context in which the very idea of
reform had changed from its original meaning. Previously seen as an
incremental application of Article 3 of the Constitution in order to reach
a more egalitarian society, reform now means, in the neoliberal context,
deregulation and increased "flexibility" of the legal system in order to
maximize the spaces of free economic enterprise.70 While proposals to
67. See SABINO CASSES, LA CRISI DELLO STATO (2002) (It.).
68. Art. 41 Costituzione [Cost.] (It.).
69. Art. 3 Decreto Legge 13 agosto 2011, n. 138 (It.).
70. Art. 3 Costituzione [Cost.] (It.) ("All citizens have equal social dignity and are equal
before the law, without distinction of sex, race, language, religion, political opinion,
personal and social conditions. It is the duty of the Republic to remove those obstacles of
an economic or social nature which constrain the freedom and equality of citizens, thereby
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reform Article 41 of the Constitution are still making their way through
Parliament, the first formal victim of the new wave of constituent
strategy (dubbed structural reform) was inaugurated by the Monti
Government is Article 81 of the Constitution.7 ' This article has been
rewritten with an overwhelming Parliamentary majority-more than
two-thirds-in two separate reads of both Chambers, to include the
balanced budget provision arguably "required" the Italians by the troika
(the EU Commission, the BCE, and the IMF). The inclusion of a
balanced budget provision, coupled with the ratification of the so-called
"fiscal compact" agreement, will make it practically impossible to
revamp the public sector and to effectively carry on the reform plan of
Article 3. The new reform ideology has taken over the Constitution of
1948, introducing, within its very text, a principle that defeats all its
promises. Furthermore, as shown by the outcome of the Water
Referendum, and later by the 2013 elections, the Parliament enjoyed a
very low popularity rate. The delegitimized Parliament, by voting for
the reform with an overwhelming majority, made it impossible for the
people to call the confirmative referendum (Article 138). The coalition
defeated in the Water Referendum did not want to risk the polls again
in their first constituent effort. Interestingly, this very significant
constitutional reform, one of the handfuls of textual changes since 1948,
has been carried out in the complete absence of debate, and when the
reform was written into law, the media did not even report the event.
Today, many usually informed citizens still do not know that the change
occurred. 72
The pressure exerted by the "troika" played a large role in installing
the technical puppet government capable of implementing austerity
measures in the absence of public support. The Monti Government,
short of being a technical executive, shows a very marked pro-business
attitude. Among its early successes, there was a pension system reform,
passed without consultation with the trade unions; a reform of the labor
market, dismantling most of the guarantees that the worker's
movement had obtained in the 1970s; and a reform of professional
services aimed at liberalization. His attention on the public
impeding the full development of the human person and the effective participation of all
workers in the political, economic and social organisation of the country."). This change of
meaning of the idea of reform is the object of UGO MATTEI, CONTRO RIFORME (2013), a
book that has been much debated in the Italian media.
71. Id. art. 81 ("Every year, Parliament shall pass the budget and the financial
statements introduced by the Government. Interim budget authority may not be granted
save by law and for not longer than four months. The Budget may not introduce new taxes
and new expenditures. Any other law involving new or increased spending shall detail the
means therefor.").
72. See Ugo Mattei, Contro Riforme, GIULlo EINAUDI 128 (2013).
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transportation system has also been sustained with an attempted
liberalization of the taxicab industry. The Government has, moreover,
linked the municipalities to a strict balanced budget requirement that
made it necessary to sell a variety of assets; it has reformed the local
taxation system by introducing a new tax on immovable property
accompanied by a revaluation of the cadastral value-all measures that
favor corporate interests by producing more privatization of public
property, including a large number of rural areas sold under value by
impoverished small owners who could not the heavy tax load. Different
measures made it even less likely to maintain public services in public
hands, and declared the area around the works of the TAV (High-Speed
Rail) train in Valsusa a "site of strategic interest" defined by a red zone
broadly protected by criminal law. In sum, by deploying a state of
emergency declaration, the Monti Government has been able to
implement a "shock doctrine," facilitating the expansion of capital and
profits from the public to the private sector.
A significant part of this policy, in particular the compulsory
privatizations of public services, has been deemed unconstitutional by
the Constitutional Court in landmark decisions 199/2012.73 The Court,
seized by a local government (Regione Puglia) represented by lawyers of
the beni comuni movement (including Ugo Mattei), decided that the
decision directly taken by the people in a referendum, as an exercise of
direct democracy, must be respected by representatives sitting in
Parliament for a reasonable amount of time. Thus the doctrine of
"succession of the law in time" that would apply should a statute have
equal value to a referendum, does not apply. Direct democracy, one of
the strongest tools of constitutional power available to the people, thus
enjoys in Italy a surplus of constitutional force compared to ordinary
legislation.
B. The Italian Water Referendum & the Beni Comuni as a National
Social Movement
The Referendum of June 13, 2011 was the climax moment of a long
struggle to limit the apparently irresistible process of neoliberal
commodification and privatization.7 4 This Referendum is often referred
to as the "Water" Referendum because much of the political momentum
leading to its success was linked to the global struggle against water
privatization, whose global visibility was granted by the Cochabamba
73. See Corte Cost., supra note 6.
74. See generally UGO MATTEI, EDOARDO REVIGLIO & STEFANO RODOTA, INVERTIRE LA
RoTrA: IDEE PER UNA RIFORMA DELLA PROPRIETA PUBBLICA (2007).
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war on water of 2000.75 Indeed, the very simple platform, "water as a
common," mobilized tens of thousands of activists from its proposal in
December 2010 to its success in June 2011, when more that 27 million
Italians went to the ballot.7 6 To understand the success of the
referendum, we need to consider two important points: first, that water
was not the only issue on which the referendum was called, and second,
that the referendum was only one part of a larger effort to challenge the
neoliberal logic of privatization, which has occupied most of the first
decade of the new millennium in Italy.
In June 2011, the Italians were called upon to vote on four
questions, only one of which was technically devoted to water.7 7 The
first referendum was aimed at stopping a compulsory program of
privatization of all public services, and involved public transportation,
garbage collection, and other public services provided by local
governments, such as nursery schools.78 The second referendum, the
only one specifically devoted to water, was aimed at abolishing a legal
provision, which guaranteed the "remuneration of the invested capital"
as part of the final cost to the user of the water supply system.79 This
referendum aimed at precluding the profit motive from the water
service, thus canceling the incentives to private companies to deal with
water. The third referendum, presented by a committee different from
the "water as a common," was aimed at abolishing the law that
re-established an Italian nuclear program,8 0 and complemented the
alternative vision of society proposed by the beni comuni movement. The
fourth referendum, promoted by the opposition party Italia dei Valori
(IDV, meaning Italian Values), was aimed at abolishing laws providing
a judicial shield to Prime Minister Berlusconi and was all but legally
empty, though very meaningful from the political point of view.
Interestingly, while all the referenda were overwhelmingly approved by
the voters with majorities of more than 95 percent, the most voted
referendum was the question specifically devoted to abolishing profit on
water.81
75. See generally OSCAR OLIVERA WITH TOM LEWIS, COCHABAMBA! WATER WAR IN
BOLIVIA (2004) (discussing the Water War, identified as the first great victory against
corporate globalization in Latin America).
76. See REFERENDUM, supra note 3.
77. Referendum 2011, FORUM ITALIANO DEI MOVIMENTI PER L'AcQUA, http://www.
acquabenecomune.org/raccoltafirme/index.php?option=com-content&view-category&layo
ut=blog&id=34&Itemid=139 (last visited Sept. 15, 2013).
78. See Corte Cost., supra note 6.
79. Id.
80. The Nuclear program was already rejected once by referendum in 1986 in the
aftermath of the Chernobyl accident.
81. See text accompanying note 4, supra.
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After a phase of negotiation with the water movement and a major
organizational effort to put together a broad coalition of civil society
organizations (which included trade unions and environmental and
consumers groups, but that purposefully excluded direct political party
participation), the referenda were finally deposited at the Court of
Cassation in Rome and signature collection officially started on April 22,
2010. This permitted the Referendum to take place in the spring of
2011, in a timely way to stop the compulsory privatization of water
designed by the Ronchi Decree.82 According to Italian constitutional law,
the half million signatures were duly collected in person and officially
certified one-by-one by a notary or other public official, and were
collected within three months from the date of the Referendum. The
collection process proved to be an incredible sign of vitality of the
commons movement, which mobilized tens of thousands of volunteers,
collecting nationwide signatures in the most remote corners of the
country.88 People usually skeptical of political collections of signatures
actually lined up, sometimes for hours, to sign, and by mid-July of 2010,
more that 1.4 million certified signatures were transported in huge
boxes in front of a crowd of media and reporters to the Court of
Cassation.84
1. Neoliberal Oppositional Powers & Battle at the Constitutional
Level
The strategy of the bi-partisan neoliberal coalition opposing the
Referendum clearly emerged from the very beginning. The Referendum
was ignored by the media, most likely because Berlusconi, well-known
for his control over official newspapers, national television channels,
and the Democratic Party in power in many regions and municipalities,
were extremely hostile to this effort of direct democracy, which could
endanger planned privatizations of the water system.85 This explains
the quite impressive silencing strategy, which was clearly aimed at
82. See Decreto Legge 25 settembre 2009, n. 135, in G.U. 25 settembre 2009, n. 223
(It.) [hereinafter Ronchi Decree].
83. On this point of the mobilization and timeline of the growth of a grassroots water
network, see Tommaso Fattori, From the Water Commons Movement to the
Commonification of the Public Realm, 112 S. ATLANTIC Q. 377, 377-87 (2013).
84. FORUM ITALIANO DEI MOVIMENTI PER L'AcQUA,
http://www.acquabenecomune.org/Referendum/Letter totheinternational-water_
movements.pdf, http://www.epsu.org/a/7217 (last visited June 15, 2013).
85. Bernedetta Brevini, The Day Italians Finally Said No to Silvio Berlusconi, THE
GUARDIAN (June 14, 2011 4:59 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/jun/
14/silvio-berlusconi-italian-referendum.
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making the referendum fail for lack of a sufficient turnout at the polls. 8 6
On the merits, the theory of our opponents was that the liberalization of
the local public services was a requirement of European law so that the
Constitutional Court could not possibly admit the referendum.8 7 As
mentioned, a referendum cannot abolish a law that is mandated by
international law, which is technically the nature of European
legislation. Nevertheless, on January 12, 2011, the Constitutional Court
gave a lesson on constitutional and European Law by admitting four of
the six questions presented, including two of the three presented by the
beni comuni movement. The lawyers involved in the argument were very
satisfied because the Court clearly stated that European Law does not
mandate liberalization nor privatization of public services, and that it is
up to the member states to decide whether they prefer to use the private
sector or whether they prefer to take direct responsibility of public
services. According to the Court, the Ronchi Decree88 was a
discretionary act of the Italian state, and as such could be abolished by
referendum according to Constitutional law.89 The Court also discussed,
as mandated by its own case law, the issue of the legal vacuum that
might follow a referendum because, should it happen after the abolition
of the law, the referendum could also not be admitted. The Court held
that there would be no vacuum in all the admitted questions because
European Law could directly be applied to fill up the vacuum, leaving to
each local municipality the choice of what to do with its own public
services.9 0
Once the obstacle of admission was passed, the real political
difficulties started, because the voters were largely ignorant of the fact
that a referendum had been called. With no help from the media, the
commons activists had to engage in a very long, old-fashioned,
door-to-door campaign because the Internet and social media, which
assisted a lot, especially among youth, are still very far from reaching
the majority of the population in Italy. To make the issue even more
difficult, Italians were already called to a double set of administrative
elections in the month of May, and the government refused to have the
referendum at the same time.9 1 Rather, it strategically opted for the last
possible dates, June 12-13, when schools were already closed, many
people were on vacation, and students were still away from home to
86. Id.
87. Italian Parliament, Manovra di Ferragosto, Atto Senato no. 2887, XVI Legislatura
(2011), www.parlamento.it/leg/16/BGT/Schedev3/Ddliter/37308.htm.
88. See Ronchi Decree, supra note 82.
89. Italian Constitutional Court, no. 23/2011 and 24/2011.
90. Id.
91. Brevini, supra note 85.
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take university exams. The legal challenge in court against the decision
of having an independent date for the referendum-costing Italian
taxpayers an estimated 300 million Euros in extra organizational
costs-was defeated because both the administrative and constitutional
jurisdictions held that the executive enjoyed discretionary power on this
matter. This almost desperate situation was subverted by the nuclear
accident of Fukushima, which produced a panic reaction by the Italian
government. The government attempted to cancel the nuclear
referendum by decree, fearful that a majority of the people would show
up to the poll as it had for a previous vote in 1986, in the aftermath of
Chernobyl.92 This attempt produced much stir in the media. This time,
the legal reaction was sustained by the Court of Cassation (that
confirmed the date of the referendum) and the accident produced a final
round of media visibility to the whole referendum campaign. In the last
few weeks, when it became clear that the victory was not beyond reach,
the Democratic Party and the largest newspaper La Repubblica finally
gave their support. Moreover, in the administrative elections of Naples,
Milan, and Cagliari, three absolute outsiders, enjoying the support of
the commons movement, won against establishment bipartisan
neoliberal candidates. Consequently, this exciting phase of Italian
political life, after the overwhelming referendum victory, became known
as the "Italian Spring," and is being credited for creating the conditions
for the fall of the Berlusconi Government. 93
The Italians had voted to invert direction away from neoliberal
ideology by participating in massive numbers to re-establish
responsibility for a renewed public sector and to defend the commons
from both privatization and mega-projects of development. This vote has
certified a large separation between the Parliament and the people. In
fact, the sitting Italian Parliament was already suffering a democratic
deficit, having been elected in 2008 with an electoral law-significantly
nicknamed "porcellum" (the pig's law)-that curtailed the possibility of
the people to choose their representatives. The current Parliament is
resented as illegitimate because it is composed of Senators and Deputies
chosen by the political parties' secretariats rather than by the people. 94
Practically every one of its members either was against the referendum
or strategically decided in its favor at the very last minute, and
92. Id.
93. Charles Hawley, The World From Berlin: 'Berlusconi Has Nothing Left to Offer',
SPIEGEL ONLINE INT'L (June 15, 2011 2:13 PM), http://www.spiegel.de/internation
alleurope/the-world-from-berlin-berlusconi-has-nothing-left-to-offer-a-768566.html.
94. Grillo Says Current Italian Parliament is 'Empty Can', LA GAZETrA DEL
MEZZOGIORNO (June 7, 2011), http://www.lagazzettadelmezzogiorno.it/english/grillo-says-
current-italian-parliament-is-empty-can-no626562.
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certainly was not ready to oppose neoliberalism. Thus, a constitutional
crisis began. The official reaction to the Italian Spring followed a path
that directly opposed the vision articulated by the commons movement.
In the summer of 2011, a strong attack by the so-called "financial
markets" targeted Italy. On the first days of August, a "secret" letter,
signed by the governors of the European Central Bank, was delivered to
Silvio Berlusconi requiring urgent action by decree to reduce the Italian
public debt. This letter required a strong liberalization policy not only of
the public services, but also of the labor market. A few days later, on
August 14, 2011, a day in which most Italians were on vacation, the
Berlusconi Government, weakened by internal infighting and by a wave
of sexual and corruption scandals, enacted a decree95 aimed at
introducing urgent measures to calm the international speculation. This
included a provision Article 4 of the Ferragosto Decree, which entirely
reproduced the text of Article 13 bis of the Ronchi Decree. By so doing,
the Government re-proposed a roadmap for obligatory liberalization and
eventual privatization of the public services, maintaining water as an
exception. An envelope containing almost 10,000 signatures on an
appeal to the President, produced by three of the legal scholars that had
prepared the referendum (Lucarelli, Mattei, and Nivarra) and collected
in only a few days via the Internet, argued that to write the decree into
law would be unconstitutional.96 The request was ignored and the
Ferragosto Decree was urgently signed into law, only to be declared
unconstitutional less than a year later by the already mentioned
decisions 199 and 200 of the Constitutional Court for its contradiction of
the referendum result which, by reproducing an obligation to sell,
abridged the prerogative of the local governments (Regions). Rather
than paying attention to the will of the people, President Napolitano
was keen on following the desires of the international business
community, and with practically no consultations, decided the name of
the next Italian Prime Minister, installing a "technical government."
Despite the respectful obedience to the European diktat of the Ferragosto
Decree, Berlusconi could not keep a majority and was forced to resign in
favor of a newly appointed Life Senator, the former European
Commissioner to the Internal Market, neoliberal economist and
President of the conservative Bocconi University in Milano, Mario
Monti. This transition, shamelessly negotiated in the shadow of the
need to please the so-called troika and the international markets,
95. Italian Parliament, supra note 87.
96. See Si AcQUA PUBBLIcA, http://www.siacquapubblica.it/ (last visited Sept. 15,
2013). See also Ugo Mattei, Beni Comuni, in GRAMMATICA DELL' INDIGNAZIONE, (L. Pepino
& M. Revelli, eds., Edizioni Gruppo Abele, forthcoming 2013).
992
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AS CONSTITUENT POWER
occurred in a context of relentless propaganda where the declared
''emergency" was to avoid "ending like Greece."
2. Beni Comuni as a National Social Movement
To explain the unexpected success of the referendum campaign, one
must consider that a national network of local water committees (active
in different parts of the country since 2001) was in place since 2006, and
a systematic scholarly effort to re-think and criticize the legal basis was
in place since 2005 and facilitating easy privatization in Italy.
Undoubtedly, these two primary forces contributed to the overall
success of the referendum.97 The idea of beni comuni, in the aftermath
of the referendum, was way beyond the single-issue movement of water.
In Italy today, the beni comuni is the recognized symbol of an alternative
and counterhegemonic vision: theoretically articulated in a manifesto
(published in September 2011)98 that generated a large political and
legal literature, many contextual struggles and, even the birth of a
political entity: Alleanza Lavoro, Beni Comuni, e Ambiente (ALBA),
devoted to the cause of the commons.99 While ALBA did not so far
succeed in gaining national relevance, a new innovative political activity
has emerged organized around a systematic and itinerant effort to draft
a Code for the commons and other related legislation to continue the
work of the RodotA Commission, which has been significantly dubbed
"Costituente per I beni comuni."100 This beni comuni movement was built
by a combination of scholars, lawyers, and activists, claiming not only
water but nature, culture, labor, and education as commons. The origins
of this movement in its different constituent dimensions are explored
below.
97. See generally RodotA Commission Bill, Delegated Legislation to Reform the Civil
Code Articles Concerning Public Property, Atto Senato n. 2031, XVI Legislatura (2010)
[hereinafter RodotA Commission Bill].
98. See generally UGO MIATTEI, BENI COMUNI: UN MANIFESTO (9th ed. 2012).
99. See ALLEANZA LAVORO BENI COMUNI AMBIENTE, www.soggettopoliticonuovo.it (last
visited Sept. 2, 2013).
100. See Teatro: Convocata al Valle Occupato la 'Costituente dei Beni Comuni, PORTALE
DEL GRUPPO ADNKRONOS, http://www.adnkronos.com/IGN/News/Spettacolo/Teatro-
convocata-al-Valle-Occupato-la-Costituente-dei-beni-comuni_3277704796.html (last
visited Sept. 1, 2013).
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a. Scholars
The effort of scholars, in particular the research carried out at the
Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei, the most prestigious scholarly
institution of the country, was critical in building the beni comuni
movement. The study carried out at the Lincei was motivated by the
observation that Italy, between 1992 and 2000, was the first country in
the world from the point of view of privatized assets (roughly 140 billion
Euros of value), making it the second worldwide (after Great Britain) in
the value of privatizations between 1979 and 2008.101 In 2007, under the
Prodi government, the scholarly effort at the Lincei established by
decree of a special commission of the Ministry of Justice. 102 Its task was
to propose a reform of the provision on public property, contained in the
Italian Civil Code, in order to establish some principles governing the
possibility and the limits of the privatization of public assets. At the fall
of the Prodi government, the now famous Rodoth Commission103
produced its reform proposal, which contained the first technical
definition of the commons as a legal category and form of property
different from both private and public ownership, deserving special
protection. This proposal, abandoned by the second Berlusconi
government (which took office in April 2008) was resurrected by a
bipartisan bill presented by the Piedmont Region in November 2009,
but was never discussed by the Senate.104 In the definition of the Rodoth
Commission, the commons are goods "that are functional to the exercise
of fundamental rights and to a free development of the human being"
101. See MATTEI, REVIGLIO & RODOTA, supra note 74.
102. Id.
103. The Rodoth Commission introduced the category of 'common goods,' that is things
that are functional to the exercise of fundamental rights and to a free development of the
human being. Common goods should be protected by the legal system to the benefit of
future generations too. Common goods' holders can be either a public legal person or a
private. In any case they should guarantee the collective fruition of common goods in the
ways and within the limits established by the law. If the holders are public legal persons,
common goods are managed by public bodies and are located out of trade and markets;
their concession/grant is allowed only in the cases provided by the law and for a limited
time, with no possibility of extension. Examples of common goods are, among the others:
rivers, streams, spring waters, lakes and other waters; the air; national parks as defined
by the law; forests and wooden areas; mountain areas at a high altitude, glaciers and
perpetual snows; seashores and coasts established as natural reserves; protected wildlife;
archeological, cultural and environmental goods." RodotA Commission Bill, supra note 97,
art. 1, 3(c). The name of the Commission is derived from the name of its President, a
leading Italian property law scholar and former distinguished member of Parliament.
104. Proposta di Legge al Parlamento [Bill to Parliament], ITALIA BENE COMUNE,
http://www.italiabenecomune.eu/index.php?option=comcontent&view-article&id=l0%3Apr
oposta-di-legge-al-parlamento&catid=9%3Adocumentazione&Itemid=8&lang-it (last visited
Sept. 1, 2013).
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and access to such goods remains whether the formal title of ownership
is public or private, and in all cases must be protected for "the benefit of
future generations." 0 5 Water was included as the first item in the open
list of the commons suggested by the Commission. While this political
and scholarly effort, justified by a sense of responsibility for future
generations, was in place (and here the influence of the Constitutional
experience of Bolivia and Ecuador was clear), the very same day,
November 26, 2009, that the RodotA text was presented in the Senate by
the Piedmont Region, the lower chamber passed, with a confidence vote
and no parliamentary discussion, the so-called "Decreto Ronchi," which
introduced a duty for local governments to follow a compulsory scheme
of privatization of all local services aimed at transferring control to the
private sector. 106 According to Article 113 bis of the Decree, by December
31, 2011, all local services controlled by the public sector, including the
water supply system, were to be placed on the market by a public
auction. Article 1 of the Decree declared that such release of public
control was mandated by European law.107 This blatant display of
neoliberal arrogance generated indignation, and within a few days six
law professors, four of whom were already members of the Rodota
commission (Professors Ugo Mattei, Alberto Lucarelli, Luca Nivarra,
Stefano RodotA, with Gaetano Azzariti, and Gianni Ferrara), drafted
three of the referendum questions, created a referendum committee,
and posted 08 a document on the Internet calling for the beginning of a
referendum procedure. Two of the questions presented were eventually
admitted by the Constitutional Court to be put on the ballot.
b. Activists Forum Acqua
The efforts of the water network (Forum Italiano dei movimenti per
1' acqua) in 2009 produced the Citizen's Initiative Bill for a Water Reform
statute, 09 which collected more than 400,000 signatures, only 50,000 of
which were necessary for such an initiative. The popular Citizen's
Initiative, however, was never discussed in Parliament. The Forum was
105. Rodota Commission Bill, supra note 97, art. 1, 1 3(c).
106. Ronchi Decree, supra note 82.
107. Id.
108. See text accompanying note 103, supra.
109. The Citizen Initiative Bill was a bill introduced by the Italian Water movement.
The first was at the regional level in Tuscany in 2005, and the second nationally in 2007.
To introduce a bill, at least 50,000 signatures must be collected to present it to
Parliament. For more on the bill, see Tommasso Fattori, Commonification of the Public
Realm, 112 S. ATLANTIC Q. 366 (Saki Bailey ed., 2013).
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crucial in organizing an impressive coalition of trade unions, consumer
movements, activist groups and a few left-wing political parties (not
represented in Parliament), which carried on a massive coordination
effort for the collection of the signatures, fundraising, and the
production of the materials necessary for the campaign.
c. "Culture as a Commons" Theater Occupations
On June 14, 2011, the day after the referendum, a group of
precarious workers of the cultural industry: actors, technicians,
musicians, and independent producers, occupied the Valle Theater in
Rome. Their motto was: "Like water and like air. Let's free culture."110
The Valle Theater, one of the oldest and most prestigious theaters in
Europe, was in the process of being relinquished by the Minister of
Culture and transferred to the Rome Municipality run by a former
Fascist mayor, putting it at risk of privatization."' The occupation was
planned as a demonstration aimed at raising public attention to a
category of workers that were suffering under the established neoliberal
policy of cuts on public spending for culture. The occupants invited this
author, Mattei, as a protagonist of the water campaign, to address the
permanent assembly, and after a lecture on "culture as a commons," a
decision was taken to make the occupation permanent and steps were
taken to develop a long-term legal and political plan of a constituent
nature. What is occurring at the Valle Theater, short from being an
action limited to the world of the arts, is an ambitious political plan to
hybridize culture, politics, and economics to transform the Valle into the
hub of a large bottom-up occupation network movement of the commons
aimed at real constituent power. The long-term plan is to develop an
"independent participant foundation,"1 2 endowed with a set of bylaws
capable of offering an example of a legal setting working as a
constitution of the commons based on a direct application of Article 43 of
the Constitution. 113 Today, the model of the Valle as a commons and as
110. Translated by authors from "Come l'acqua, come l'aria: Liberiamo i saperi." See
Come L'acqua, Come L'aria: Liberiamo i Saperi, VALLE, http://www.teatrovalleoccupato.it
/come-lacqua-come-laria-liberiamo-i-saperi (last visited Sept. 15, 2013).
111. Saki Bailey & Maria Edgarda Marcucci, Legalizing the Occupation: The Teatro
Valle as a Cultural Commons, 112 S. ATLANTIC Q. 396 (2013). See also Teatro Valle
Occupato: One Year and a Half of Commoning (English Version), VALLE, http://www
.teatrovalleoccupato.it/teatro-valle-occupato-one-year-and-half-of-commoning-english-
version (last visited Sept. 15, 2013).
112. See Chi Siamo [Who We Are], TEATRO VALLE OCCUPATO, http://www.teatrovalleocc
upato.it/chi-siamo (last visited Dec. 12, 2012).
113. See Art. 43 Costituzione [Cost.] (It.). A "Community of workers and users" is now
running the theater that is thriving in the heart of Rome. Such a "community," mentioned
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a method of occupation is being put in action not only in Rome (Teatro
Valle and Cinema Palazzo), but also in Venice (Teatro Marinoni),
Catania (Teatro Coppola), Naples (Asilo Filangieri), Palermo (Teatro
Garibaldi), Pisa (Teatro Rossi), Messina (Teatro Pinelli), and Milan
(Macao). In Milan, a thirty-one-story building was occupied on May 5,
2012, in order to transform it into a "cultural common" before being
evacuated by a very controversial police reaction. 114 This bottom-up
constituent effort is rooted in the people's right of resistance and links
together all the apparently distant struggles against the neoliberal
politics carried on by those that suffer most under its destructive
policy.115
in Art. 43 of the Constitution, is neither a public nor a private institution but rather an
experience of revolutionary commoning, such as that of workers in Nazi-occupied Italy.
114. See Macao, Addio alla Torre Galfa Occupato un Palazzo a Brera, LA REPUBBLICA
MILANO (May 19, 2012), http://milano.repubblica.it/cronaca/2012/05/19/news/macaoaddio
_alla torre-galfa~occupato unsalazzoabrera-35475294/. Another ambitious occupation
attempt has been successful, however, in Pisa, where a large abandoned factory has been
occupied, defended against owner's attempts to recover it, and transformed into a
"municipio dei beni comuni," with a restaurant, library, workshops, carpenter, bicycle
mechanic, nursery school, and sustainable marketplace. The legal case will be argued in
court on September 20.
115. The commons movement has quite systematically used the strategy of physical
occupation for reclaiming and actually managing commons. Such a strategy directly
challenges existing constitutionally reinforced private property relations. From the point
of view of property law, these actions would be deemed "illegal"; however, the commons
movement refuses the idea of being engaged in an "illegal" practice. Rather, the claim is
that occupations are aimed at opening up enclosed common spaces, the access to which is
constitutionally guaranteed, and are therefore to be considered legitimate exercises of
people's constituent power. These actions are viewed as legitimate so long as they
genuinely are aimed at creating access to property (both private and public) to implement
its "social function" and to defend the public interest from the abusive use of the right to
exclude. It is argued that these occupations are aimed at "opening up" public and private
spaces by a formally "illegal" action to recover people's possession of under-utilized or
corruptly utilized spaces, functioning as a sort of peoples "drittwirkung," (horizontal
application of Constitutional law in private law matters), whose legitimacy is determined
by the actual capacity to resist an illegal rule of law by counter-hegemonically turning the
law against itself and subverting the very meaning of legality. This, however, still begs the
question, when is occupation, which is the very physical act of resisting existing property
relations, a legitimate constituent action? The answer to this question cannot be in the
law itself. See Gunther Teubner, Self-Subversive Justice: Contingency or Transcendence
Formula of Law?, 72 MOD. L. REV. 1 (2009). Gunther Teubner poses the question: "Is it
lawful to apply the distinction between lawful and unlawful to the world?" Id. at 18. He
answers, 'Thus, as soon as the law encounters its own paradox, then it is exposed to the
question of justice." Id. Justice, and not law, must be the standard by which to judge what
forms of constituent power and which constituent actions are legitimate. Teubner
describes this process as an "ongoing discursive process within legal practice itself," which
can include actions of those outside of the legal profession, including citizen's protests. Id.
at 14. See also NIKLAS LUHMANN, Justice, a Formula for Contingency, in LAw AS A SOCIAL
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d. "Nature, Labor, and Education as a Commons"
In the aftermath of the referendum, in the Valle di Susa near Turin,
the NoTAV movement (opposing high-speed rail development), which in
the last twenty years had resisted a mega development project of a new
fifty-six kilometer tunnel through the Alps, occupied an area close to the
area where the first perforations were supposed to take place. The
movement has declared the area a "Libera Repubblica della Maddalena"
(Liberate the Republic of Maddalena), and has experienced, for more
than a month, a community economy based on gift and cooperation. It
would be beyond the scope of this paper to describe this long and still
ongoing saga, however, suffice it to say that the Susa Valley population
is still systematically accused-by a media system in a blatant conflict
of interest-as a violent and illegal NIMBY (not in my backyard)
approach, which has been attacked by the police with violent means and
incarceration of activists.11 6 There again was presented, in a very large
assembly, with this author as a representative of the water movement,
the idea that the NoTAV was a commons movement, opposing in the
general interest the same logic of economic and political concentration of
the nuclear industry. The Maddalena was violently evacuated by the
police on the morning of June 26, 2011, but the motto of "NoTAV"
"nature as a common" remained, a radical reconfiguration of the NIMBY
idea from the individual "not in my yard" to the defense of collective
needs and interests. The theory of the commons has connected the
SYSTEM 211 (Fatima Kastner et al. eds., Klaus A. Ziegert trans., 2004). Luhmann
describes the relationship of justice to the law as law's contingency formula. He says,
"[J]ustice can only mean an adequate complexity of consistent decision-making." Id. at 219.
Teubner interprets that justice is not found within the consistency of legal decision,
"Justice as law's contingency formula explicitly goes beyond internal consistency. It is
located at the boundary between the law and its external environment and means both
the historical variability of justice and its dependency on this environment." Teubner,
supra, at 12. The legal system reduces issues of justice to the "binary code" of
legality/illegality, but the social world is far more complex than this binary. As Teubner
states, "justice needs then to be understood as the subversive practices of law's
self-transcendence." Id. at 3. The subjects capable of subversive practices must come from
an outside position, not necessarily outside the law but in an observational capacity. "In
order to find one's way in challenging, as it were, artificial situations, one must observe
the observers." LUHMANN, supra, at 227. These observers may include judicial decision
makers or legislators, but as mentioned above are not limited to the legal profession. Id. at
228. Though Teubner does not explicitly include civil society actors or the strategy of
occupation, these authors (Bailey & Mattei) take the position that the commons social
movements may provide this third outside perspective of justice into the legal system:
replacing the economic contingency installed by governments and corporations with a
social and global justice contingency.
116. For a site reporting the most recent arrests, see La Valle Non Si Arresta,
NOTAVINFO, www.notav.info (last visited Sept. 15, 2013).
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NoTAV with the Valle Theater, water, no nukes, and many other
experiences of anti-neoliberal resistance. The motto was carried in
Turin at the head of a demonstration of more than 20,000 participants
that for the first time brought the NoTAV outside of the closed
perimeter of the Susa Valley. Instrumental to the success of this march
was the Federazione Impiegati Operai Metallurgici (FIOM, a
metalworkers trade union), just expelled from the FIAT factory after a
dramatic blackmail referendum on January 13, 2011. The trade union
marched on October 16, 2010, in Rome, right in the middle of the water
campaign, in a gigantic demonstration led by the motto "11 Lavoro 6 un
bene comune" (Labor is a common good). In addition, on December 15,
2011, while the Berlusconi Government was beginning to lose its
majority in Parliament because of infighting in the post-fascist part of
its coalition, a massive student demonstration against the University
Reform Bill took place in Rome, and was stopped by the police, resulting
in many arrests of students. Here again, the motto of the protest, which
involved many student unions active in the referendum campaign, was
"L'Universit6 6 un bene comune" (The University is a common good).
e. Assessor of the Commons & ABC Napoli
In Naples, mayor Luigi De Magistris, elected as a complete outsider
just weeks before the referendum victory thanks to the strong
endorsement of environmental and social activists, in the middle of an
embarrassing crisis of garbage accumulation through the city, appointed
one of the drafters of the Water Referendum (Alberto Lucarelli) to a
newly-established post, that of "Assessor to the commons" (Assessore ai
bene comune). This key political role is aimed at experimenting with
new forms of local participatory democracy based on Article 43 of the
Constitution, and to create a new participant institutional system of
governance for the local utilities corporation, in what is the third largest
Italian city.
Aqua Bene Comune Napoli (ABC Napoli) was transformed officially
into a commons corporation on April 22, 2013. This new "public-common
partnership" (as opposed to the public/private partnership) is an
experiment (and later hopefully a model) of how public law tools can be
utilized to protect citizen's access to clean and affordable water as well
as to increase democratic participation and transparency in water
management. Its legal form in Italian public law takes the form of
"azienda speciale," drawing upon an existent form of the public
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corporation, however modified to pursue a public and "living purpose"117
which serves humans and the environment in a sustainable manner, as
opposed to in the pursuit of profit. This public-common special
corporation is a unique case of a public legal form employed by
municipal agencies in designing a new type of commons institution
aimed at the partnership not of the market and state, but rather the
state and citizens. The partnership pursued by ABC's charter attempts
to restructure the interaction between the different actors in the public
sector and civil society in order to emphasize their complementarity by
promoting forms of self-organization and the inclusion and participation
of workers and users of water.
As a result of this, the municipality of Naples has thus become a
hub for commons activism, having launched a variety of campaigns,
including a campaign for a "European Charter of the Commons," to be
proposed as a citizen's initiative to the European Commission according
to Article 11 of the Lisbon Treaty.118 A proposed draft of the Charter,
drafted by a high-level academic conference in December 2011, at the
International University College of Turin, presented at an International
Conference at the Valle Theater in Rome in February 2012, and
discussed Europe-wide through partners at European Alternatives' 19
elaborated the best strategy to make this action effective. Meanwhile,
two European Citizen's Initiatives, one organized by the water
movements under the leadership of Riccardo Petrella and the second by
labor unions, has already collected more than the one million necessary
signatures to bring the issue before the Commission.
In sum, the beni comuni movement engaged constituents in a
constitutional process from the bottom up: invoking legal tools at local,
national, and even super-national levels, and carrying out a strategy
through both private and public law tools wherever possible. For
example, the occupation of the Valle Theater attempted to translate its
radically democratic practice into the private law tool of the foundation,
a counterhegemonic use of the law. Other struggles, such as the water
campaign and the NoTAV movement are using a variety of legal tools:
including resort to courts of law--ordinary, administrative, and even
117. For examples of corporations pursuing a living purpose which could be considered
within a broad understanding of "common institutions," see MARJORIE KELLY, OwNING
OUR FUTURE: THE EMERGING OWNERSHIP REVOLUTION (2012).
118. Regulation (EU) 211/2011, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16
February 2011 on the Citizens' Initiative, 2011 O.J. (L 65).
119. European Alternatives is a civil society organization devoted to exploring the
potential for transnational politics and culture. Meetings promoting the commons and the
Charter were organized through the Trans Europa Festival in a number of European
cities, including London, Rome, Berlin, Paris, Zagreb, and Sophia. About Us, EUROPEAN
ALTERNATIVES, http:// http://www.euroalter.com/about-us/ (last visited Apr. 14, 2013).
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constitutional-to vindicate respect of the referendum and to protect the
rights of the people against the antidemocratic use of public authority.
In other places, such as in the case of Naples, the very structure of local
government authority has been modified to relinquish power to the
people for participatory governance of the commons. Finally, the
availability of such tools of public participation, which have been
provided very recently by European law, such as the European Citizens
Initiative, are also in the toolkit beni comuni activists to carry in their
struggles at the European level. Most significant however, was the
contribution of the beni comuni movement in modifying the constitution
in action by giving full force and effective application to the previously
unapplied provisions of the 1948 Constitutional text, as discussed in the
first section, bringing life to the "economic constitution" to defend the
public and common against the private sector.
III. SOCIETAL CONSTITUTIONALISM OF THE COMMONS FROM BELOW
VERSUS TOP-DowN ECONOMIC CONSTITUTIONALISM
The current decline of state sovereignty as a result of the collusion
between public and private sectors, exemplified by the Italian case,
suggests that maintaining-and expanding at the global level-a liberal
constitutional model will simply recreate the conditions for the
continuous enclosure of common resources into private property, and
the Multitude into a disempowered constituency of an economic
constitution imposed from above without their consent. This section
analyzes the supranational constitutional process and considers
whether the beni comuni movement is part of an oppositional global
constituency made up of transnational social movements. In this
context, we apply the theory of societal constitutionalism. Can a societal
constitutionalism of the commons from below mount a challenge to the
economic constitutionalism imposed from above?
A. Democratizing Economic Constitutionalism through Social
Movements
A number of scholars120 have answered the challenge of articulating
a theory of constitutionalism beyond the state: "This approach views
120. Most notably, Gunther Teubner and the scholars, including Saskia Sassen, who
were present at the Transnational Societal Constitutionalism conference organized by
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constitutionalism as a continuum, and constitutionalization as the
process by which various entities acquire constitutional
characteristics." 121 This wider pluralist conception of constitutionalism
has been applied to argue for constitutional processes taking place not
only in the political sphere, but also in economic and societal spheres.122
Many scholars have applied this analysis to argue that a process of
"economic constitutionalism" is taking place through transnational
economic institutions like the WTO and the EU.123 These scholars argue
that these institutions demonstrate constitutional features such as
"plausible claims to sovereignty, jurisdictional scope, tenets of
citizenship and modes of representation."124 Indeed the WTO and EU
both exhibit these characteristics, though as explored below, the lack of
democratic representation remains controversial. However, the
"systems of transnational law, especially trade law, function as
'constitutions' in the sense that they subordinate national constitutions,
that is, treat national constitutions as legal regimes under their
jurisdiction . . . and open them to free trade." 25 The WTO organization,
based on "consensus," and a Dispute Resolution body, which is only a
sui generis court of law, generates much of its law in a "soft" form,
officially under the "suspension of application" of an offending state, but
which unofficially operates in effect by the threat of sanction 26 enforced
by the political or economic retaliation of member states. 127 However,
this retaliation enforcement mechanism depends upon stronger member
states creating asymmetrical enforcement of Dispute Settlement
Understanding (DSU) decisions. As a result, suggested by Peer
Professor Gunther Teubner at the International University College of Turin on May 17-18,
2012.
121. Anderson, supra note 45.
122. Id.
123. See, e.g., id. Neil Walker, The EU and the WTO: Constitutionalism in a New Key, in
THE EU AND THE WTO: LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 31 (Griinne de Bdrca &
Joanne Scott eds., 2001); Joel P. Trachtman, The Constitutions of the WTO, 17 EUR. J.
INT'L L. 623 (2006).
124. Anderson, supra note 45.
125. Tully, supra note 17, at 319 n.7.
126. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
art. 22, in Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (April 15, 1994), Annex
2, in WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS
(1999) [hereinafter DSU]. Article 22 never formally uses the word sanction, but rather
states that a plaintiff government has the right to "to suspend the application to the
Member concerned of concessions or other obligations under the covered agreements."
127. Andrew T. Guzman & Beth Simmons, Power Plays and Capacity Constraints: The
Selection of Defendants in WTO Disputes, American Law and Economics Association
Annual Meetings Paper 52 (2005), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=660501.
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Zumbansen above, transnational law produced by such institutions like
the IMF, World Bank, and the WTO operate as "economic constitutions"
precisely because they are capable of forcing weaker state governments
to implement neoliberal reform not only in the periphery, in the form of
loan conditioned structural adjustment programs and sanctions, but at
the very heart of the West, through loan conditioning and austerity
measures. The "constitutional" nature of these economic laws is defined
not just by their constitutional features such as the "disembeddedness of
rules" (Tully) or "secondary rules" (H.L.A Hart), "plausible claims to
sovereignty, jurisdictional scope, tenets of citizenship and modes of
representation rules" (Anderson & Walker), but also by the "the
allocation of authority over other constitutions" (Trachtman), which
may assist us to understand the way in which the subordination of
national constitutions to transnational law may be the most important
criteria for the presence of a supranational economic constitutional
process at work.128 Trachtman adds to H.L.A Hart's concept of
"secondary rules" as the rules of recognition, rules of change, and rules
of adjudication by adding what he calls a "tertiary rule." This tertiary
rule refers to the nonexclusive nature of constitutional rules and the
process of inter-constitutional dialogue that takes place not only
between constitutions at the state and federal level as we know takes
place in the U.S. federal system, but also between constitutions at the
state and supranational levels.129 To demonstrate this, he points to the
dialogue that takes place between courts and legislatures in
interpreting laws between the EU level and member states level. The
member states of the European Union, while far from ratifying a
political constitution, are bound by the laws of the European Union in
many areas of law through the EU Directives mechanism. However,
more than the mere interpretation of a hierarchy of rules over others, or
the idea of the constitution as the "supreme" law of the land, which is
useful in understanding the way in which courts institutionalize the
constitution, what is more interesting and relevant, according to
Trachtman, in understanding constitutional processes on the
supranational level, is the ability of political and economic entities to
exert authority and institutionalize a political and economic hierarchy,
even absent law and a textual constitution, that allocates such
authority. It has become increasingly clear since the eruption of the
Euro-zone crisis that the European Union exerts economic pressure
through the European Central Bank, imposing a de facto hierarchy of
European decision-making over state sovereignty well beyond the limits
128. Trachtman, supra note 123, at 627.
129. Id.
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of the Treaty of Lisbon. This influence of the European Central Bank in
the installation of the Monti technical government in Italy was
discussed earlier in Part II. 130 However, can we really take mere brute
assertion of authority as criteria for the presence of a "constitutional"
process? Isn't the very promise of constitutionalism the restraint of
tyrannical power? Perhaps not. There are, after all, many constitutions
in the world at the nation-state level that allocate authority in
seemingly unjust ways, so why not at the supranational level?
What is clear is that while the WTO and European Union exhibit
many constitutional features, these organizations fail on one crucial
criteria of most western liberal democracies: they lack democratic
representation though in different ways. The WTO (much like
International Human Rights Regime) depends on the will of stronger
states and thus favors those states in its enforcement, as discussed
earlier. The European Union also similarly fails to meet the criteria of
democratic representation because it lacks a political constitution and
depends on technocrats of the European Commission for its
implementation. Even if we could argue that the member states are
represented in the European Parliament: representative democracy is
failing both at the supranational level and at the state level, as
discussed earlier in Parts I and II, resulting in state representatives
often working against the interests of their own people. Both of the
economic constitutions of the WTO and the European Union fail in their
democratic representation because they lack a constituency capable of
restraining the sovereign by demanding democratic accountability.
However, even with these many problems, the possibility of
democratizing the supranational constitutional process remains
attractive to many scholars, because it may provide the only way to
unveil what is currently understood as technocratic "economic" decisions
and subject them to a political process. In this spirit, some scholars
promote constitutional pluralism in economic constitutionalism-calling
for the broader inclusion of the voice of nonwestern states, and most
interestingly, of nongovernmental actors. 131 A pluralist and open vision
of constitutionalism thus considers the multiple forms constituents may
take outside of the nation-state, the liberal constitutional form, and
traditional politics. Some scholars are analyzing social movements as a
positive counter-hegemonic force to the constituent power of western
states, "providing a 'discursive interface between international
organizations and a global citizenry' capable of 'monitor(ing)] policy
making in these institutions . . . bring(ing) citizens [sic] concerns into
130. See Part II discussion, supra, about the Monti Government.
131. See, e.g., Buchanan, supra note 13.
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their deliberations and empower(ing) marginalized groups so that they
too may participate effectively in global politics."1 32 Similar to the way
in which social movements, as discussed in the U'wa case, are able to
place local communities directly in contact with multinationals, social
movements may also be capable of facilitating a relationship between
economic institutions like the WTO and the people or the Multitude.
Ruth Buchanan, however, along with many others, argues that
social movements are far from being representative of the peoples' will.
She critiques the way in which the countermovement has been
primarily led by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and the
similar problems of NGOs with governmental actors, such as agendas
driven by their funders and, as a result, very weak political subjectivity.
Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) scholars are
referring to this problem as the "NGOization" of social movements.133
For example, Makau wa Mutua points to the incestuous origins of many
influential NGOs-they often share the same founders and governing
boards as one another; many sharing the same economic, cultural, and
class background." 4 Like Buchanan, Marti Koskenniemi argues for
pluralism in the economic constitutional process, but similarly points
out the striking "homogeneity of the cultural and professional outlook"
of those participants involved on both sides, offering the same legal and
technical solutions.13 The policies generated by NGOs often mirror that
of the WTO and the European Union because they embrace the same
liberal "development" and "efficiency" rhetoric as their counterparts. In
this context, the commons social movement as a genuinely spontaneous
force defined by its direct political action and resisting representation
may prove itself to be immune to the normalizing effect of NGOization
by deploying a number of strategies and tactics that challenge the brute
deployment of authority discussed in Part II, some of which challenge
enforce state constitutional guarantees and other illegal constituent
practices that target the illegality of the official rule of law."136
Commons movements tend to demand representation by those who
are actually part of the movement. Often members are extremely
suspicious about foreign funders and outside organizers, and even reject
132. Id. at 662-63.
133. RAJAGOPAL, supra note 35, at 258.
134. Makau wa Mutua, The Ideology of Human Rights, 36 VA. J. INT'L L. 589, 613-15
(1996).
135. Martti Koskenniemi, Talk at Harvard University, Global Legal Pluralism: Multiple
Regimes and Multiple Modes of Thought 21 (Mar. 5, 2005), http://www.helsinki.fl/ecilPub
lications/KoskenniemilMKPluralism-Harvard-05d[1].pdf.
136. LAuRA NADER, THE LIFE OF THE LAW: ANTHROPOLOGICAL PROJECTS (2005); UGO
MATTEI & LAURA NADER, PLUNDER: WHEN THE RULE OF LAW is ILLEGAL (2008).
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them when they know it will undermine their local legitimacy. 13 7
Furthermore, as discussed in a previous section, social movements may
be far more capable than NGOs of challenging existing institutions and
offering true alternatives, because they are actually engaged in the
practice of governing the commons. These movements may provide the
much-needed institutional "imagination" necessary to formulate true
alternatives to the development, rights, and private property packages
promoted by the modern liberal state and international economic
institutions. The local and practice-oriented nature of commons
movements may thus provide the much needed legitimacy and
imagination in the making of a pluralistic and open constitutional
process. The question that remains is whether such a process could take
place at the supranational level absent current constitutional
guarantees for democratic participation.
B. Societal Constitutionalism of the Commons
In a debate which took place in May 2011 between Antonio Negri
and Gunther Teubner, 'The Law of the Common,"138 one of the key
questions presented was: "[w]here is the [p]otential space for [common]
social movements in its relation to global governance?"1 39 The point of
intellectual tension between Negri and Teubner in the debate over this
question was the issue of the characterization of the "private" as
"private property" and the danger of the "common" replacing the
"public." Teubner stated:
While the "common" seeks to overcome the alienation of
the private via collective activities and collective modes
of attribution, the "public" tends to strengthen the space
of open and democratic deliberation, which finds its
different forms in each social field. Undoubtedly,
common property has a powerful potential, which has
been suppressed under the domination of neo-liberal
policies of private property. But the choice between
different attributions of property rights cannot be
decided a priori on theoretical grounds in favour of the
137. RAJAGOPAL, supra note 35.
138. See Debate, The Law of the Common: Globalization, Property and New Horizons of
Liberation, 21 FINN. Y.B. INT' L L. 1 (2010).
139. Id. at 5.
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commons, but needs to be governed by public reflection
processes within each sphere of life. 140
Teubner argues is that an a priori preference for the commons could
result in the dominance over all spheres of life-social, political, and
economic-that serves to suppress the integrity and autonomous logics
of these other life spheres just as the market society subjects society to
the economy. In this way, the commons could-if certain safeguards are
not institutionalized internally-promote the regression into a sort of
local tribalism, where communities operate as commons "inside" but as
private property "outside,"141 excluding users outside of the community
to the resources controlled within and, as Teubner points out, shielding
this exclusion from public and open democratic deliberation. The
emphasis on local control of the commons, as opposed to its direct
participatory and deliberative potential, may draw us back to the idea of
inherited characteristics as the criteria for membership in these
communities, as opposed to membership based on a more open criteria
like citizenship or basic human needs and flourishing. This, in effect,
would defeat the emancipatory potential of the commons as a critique of
private property and rather transform it into a tool for its
reinforcement-absent the restraints provided by the public-in the
form of the democratic state, or, absent a state, that of self-imposed
restraints of the community. The question that emerges is whether it is
possible for communities-absent a state-level constitutional process-to
provide these self-restraints which ensure the equitable access for those
beyond the localized commons community to fundamental resources
which should be accessible to all. Teubner and others suggest that such
constitutional processes of open public reflection and self-restraint are
possible and are taking place beyond the state in civil society.
Constitutional approaches beyond the nation-state can be used to
describe the economic constitutionalism taking place from "above," as
discussed in the previous section, but they can also provide tools for
understanding and describing constitutional processes taking place
"from below." They can be used to describe the "societal
constitutionalism"142 taking place in civil society, as has been argued by
140. Id. at 14.
141. See Carol M. Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and
Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 742 (1986) (discussing the commons as
vesting property rights in groups that are capable of self-management).
142. DAVID SCIULLI, CORPORATE POWER IN CIVIL SOCIETY: AN APPLICATION OF SOCIETAL
CONSTITUTIONALISM (2001); DAVID SCiULLI, THEORY OF SOCIETAL CONSTITUTIONALISM:
FOUNDATIONS OF A NON-MARXIST CRITICAL THEORY (1992); David Sciulli, Foundations of
Societal Constitutionalism: Principles From the Concepts of the Communicative Action and
Procedural Legality, 39 BRIT. J. SOCIETAL Soc. 377 (1988).
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other scholars about civil society organizations like labor unions,
consumer associations, environmental associations, and digital
regulation communities,143 which describe constitutional processes
taking place "below the radar" of the state.
Instead, civil constitutions are formed in underground
evolutionary processes of long duration in which the
juridification of social sectors also incrementally
develops constitutional norms, although they remain as
it were embedded in the whole set of legal norms. In the
nation-state, the glare of the political constitution has
been so blinding that the individual constitutions of the
civil sectors have not been visible, or at best, have
appeared as part of political constitutions. 144
Law and lawmaking in this context take place outside the
designated liberal constitutional forms of law creation by legislatures
and courts, and rather exhibit constitutional features produced by the
internal regulations and governance institutions from within these
diverse forms of social organization.
Applying this theory of societal constitutionalism, the commons
movements may not only be understood to act as sites for mobilizing
civil society actors as new global constituents in a process of economic
constitutionalism as discussed previously, but can also be analyzed as
sites of constitutional-as opposed to tribalistic-processes of
community-based resource governance.
Do the commons present a site of constituents engaged in their own
civil or societal constitutional processes or are they merely the sites of
local tribalism, or as as discussed earlier, sites of protest and the
demand for inclusion as constituents in the global economic
constitution? As Michael Hardt explains in an interview, the previous
alter-globalization movements (i.e. Seattle, Washington, Genoa) were
nomadic, and functional for mapping the nodes of economic power.
However in contrast, many recent protests are taking the form of
occupation movements-sharing the same fight against the corporate
agenda and the negative effects of capitalism as the alter-globalization
movement-that are rooted in time and space for longer periods,
therefore presenting new opportunities for organization and alternative
143. See Anderson, supra note 45, for an excellent discussion of the theory of societal
constitutionalism as applied to social movements in this article.
144. Teubner, supra note 12, at 18.
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forms of governance.14 5 Many commons communities in the commons
movement described in Part II in the Italian beni comuni movement and
the commons movements in the Global South (discussed earlier this
section), rather than forming solely as protests, are instead reasserting
their right to govern the resources that most affect their lives, currently
under threat by the state and the corporation. While it would be beyond
the scope of the paper to explore the potentially constitutional features
of each suborganization of the larger beni comuni movement in Italy
(water, theater, labor, education, nature),146 we offer one example of the
Teatro Valle. The Valle, much like the Occupy movement, has adopted
the decision-making method of the "General Assembly," where decisions
on programming, direction, funding, and the like are made through a
process of "consensus" rather than by majority vote. While there is often
disagreement, and not always wholehearted agreement, the procedural
rule commits the community to a deliberative process where all
viewpoints, even the most marginal, are considered before a final
decision.147 Many commons scholars have noted similar deliberative
processes in other commons communities, and such procedural
structuring rules have been linked to the effectiveness of these
communities to manage resources over long periods of time. 148 The
scholarship of Nobel Prize winner Elinor Ostrom describes the
institutionalization of such informal rules in governing the commons in
terms of "institutional design," and commons property scholars have
demonstrated in an overwhelming amount of case studies how the
commons operate as systems of regulation that draw upon both formal
and informal sources of law in governing common resources in
sustainable way contrary to what is argued in G. Hardin's "Tragedy of
the Commons."149 As one commons scholar says, "[a] resource
arrangement that works in practice can work in theory."1 50 Commons
communities are offering tested best practices-some over thousands of
years-which empirically challenge the logic of neoclassical economics
145. Saki Bailey & Tommaso Dotti, Occupying the Commons: Teatro Valle Occupato,
THE COMMONS SENSE (Aug. 23, 2012), http://www.commonssense.it/sl/?pageid=938.
146. See Bailey, supra note 2.
147. See Bailey & Dotti, supra note 145. For an in-depth discussion of the governance of
the Valle, see Bailey & Marcucci, supra note 111.
148. See, e.g., F. Berkes et al., The Benefits of the Commons, 340 NATURE 91, 93 (1989);
David Feeny et al., The Tragedy of the Commons: Twenty-Two Years Later, 18 HuM.
ECOLOGY 1, 10-11 (1990).
149. See, e.g., ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF
INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990); Elinor Ostrom, Community and the
Endogenous Solution of Commons Problems, 4 J. THEORETICAL POL. 343, 344-45 (1992).
150. Lee Anne Fennell, Ostrom's Law: Property Rights in the Commons, 5 INT'L. J.
COMMONS 9, 9 (2011) (emphasis omitted).
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and neoliberal policies. While this scholarship on commons uses the
language of "institutional design" as opposed to "societal
constitutionalism," the two approaches share much in common with one
another, as they similarly analyze forms of customary and informal law
produced outside of formal legislation.
If the presence of law-either as enforceable entitlements or norms
reinforced by sanctions-is one prerequisite for the presence of a
"constitutional" process, could formally illegal actions like the
occupation of the Valle given in the previous example undermine their
"constitutional" nature? Teubner suggests in the debate mentioned
earlier that the answer hinges on whether the commons can "thematise
the restrictedness of their specialized perspective and [ ] infer
self-limitations for their expansionist course of action." 15 1 Here, Teubner
does not state that social constitutionalism depends on the adoption or
rejection of the binary of illegality/legality but, however, depends upon
the ability of the site of societal constitutionalism to impose or adopt
rules of self-limitation, which restrain their actions from expanding into
other spheres of life and reinforce the integrity of other constitutional
processes at work in society. While the illegal occupation of the Valle
was necessary to the birth of the process of a societal
constitutionalism-the rules and practices of the commons-and the
very assertion of their "specialized perspective" (commons as an
organizing principle and logic), the expansion and imposition of these
rules and practices to other spheres of life-like, for example, politics or
the economy-must be subjected to open processes of deliberation.
While specific sites of the commons may exhibit their own intrinsic
divides between inclusion and exclusion, their commitment to
deliberative processes both within these sites, as well as between these
sites, provides an important guarantee for self-restraint.
As Teubner states regarding societal constitutionalism, "[t]he
outcome is a multiplicity of independent global villages, each of which
develops an intrinsic dynamic of its own as an autonomous area."152 In
this way, societal constitutionalism is not just the constitutionalism of
one particular social sector or community, but rather the aggregation of
multiple autonomous sites of constitutionalism in civil society. In this
way, the rules of self-limitation in the commons movement may be
accomplished precisely through the multiplicity inherent in the
movement itself. The plurality of actors and sites that exist within the
commons are as diverse as the wide spectrum of interests represented in
society: labor reflects the interest of workers, environmentalists reflects
151. Teubner, supra note 115, at 6.
152. Teubner, supra note 12, at 14.
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the interest of nature, digital communities reflect the interest of their
users, and so on. Each one in turn generates a plurality of their own
civil constitutions. Within the transnational commons movement, there
are many autonomous sites, autonomous not only in agenda, but
physically autonomous by geography-Indian farmers coordinating
common seed banks, New Jersey trawlers coordinating their common
fishing grounds, Thai communities coordinating their forest resources,
and the occupants of the Valle theater. It may be this very multiplicity
of societal constitutionalism within the commons movement which could
serve to promote open deliberation and self-imposed limitations;
movements that are autonomous from one another, but linked together
in their common struggle against predatory state and market actors.
Activist Naomi Klein suggests the Zapatistas version:
The Zapatistas have a phrase for this. They call it "one
world with many worlds in it." Some have criticized this
as a New Age non-answer. They want a plan. "We know
what the market wants to do with those spaces, what do
you want to do? Where's your scheme?" I think we
shouldn't be afraid to say: "That's not up to us." We need
to have some trust in people's ability to rule themselves,
to make the decisions that are best for them. We need to
show some humility where now there is so much
arrogance and paternalism. To believe in human
diversity and local democracy is anything but wishy-
washy. Everything in McGovernment conspires against
them. Neoliberal economics is biased at every level
towards centralization, consolidation, homogenization. It
is a war waged on diversity. Against it, we need a
movement of radical change, committed to a single world
with many worlds in it, that stands for "the one no and
the many yesses."153
Central to the commons movement is the very rejection of the idea
that all of life can be reduced to neoliberal economics, or in other words,
the totalization of the economic sphere in all other spheres of life. The
commons movement is the very promotion of the democratization and
diversification of the economy from the bottom up and, as such, a
critique of the market society and neoliberal policy. In fact, it is the
localized and contextual nature of the commons which presents a
tremendous challenge for unity as global constituency united against
153. Klein, supra note 33, at 89.
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top-down economic constitutionalism; but this very fragmentation may
catalyze a truly open deliberative process that provides a natural limit
to the possibly destructive tendencies of each site of societal
constitutionalism.
CONCLUSION
The common goods movement in Italy is a powerful example of the
way in which social movements are emerging as the new pouvoir
constituant as an oppositional force to the process of economic
constitutionalism imposed by international economic institutions. They
are proving, on both national and supranational levels, that politically
active persons organized as social movements are a potent source of
constituent power. We argue here that social movements are engaged in
the enforcement of national constitutional protections of the public
through counter-hegemonic uses of the law, and also at the
transnational level, where they are forming global networks capable of
not only negotiating with corporate power directly, but also of
influencing the top-down economic constitutionalism imposed from
above. Social movements are expanding our notion of the public sphere
and politics outside of parliamentary processes. Commons social
movements are not only sites of political protest outside of traditional
political arenas, but also sites of societal constitutionalism, producing
alternative forms of resource governance and management. These
alternatives provide not just theoretical, but empirical challenges to
private property and the developmental state assumed by the liberal
constitutional form. To promote a truly pluralist and open vision of
constitutionalism, which renews the constituent power of the Multitude,
there must be full recognition of the disempowering effects of two
fundamental institutions of current capital accumulation: the sovereign
state and private ownership. These two institutions share a model of
concentration of power and of exclusion that has incrementally squeezed
the public interest outside of constitutional law by an imbalance
favoring the guarantees of private property over those of democracy.
Restoration of the democratic constitutional fabric is a constituent
action as long as the struggle for the commons is rooted in the
democratic practice of a Multitude with the purpose of restoring the
interest of the people over that of profit. In Italy, for instance,
constitutional protections are clearly available in a number of mostly
unimplemented (Articles 9 and 43) provisions of the 1948 Constitution,
most fundamentally in Article 3 and Article 42. Given the failure of
representative government and state politics, it is up to the beni comuni
movement to reclaim their constituent role in enforcing the constitution
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and reasserting the role of popular sovereignty. The constituent struggle
for the commons aims to produce a new common sense by exposing the
contradictions of the state-private property dualism that colonized the
modern imagination and underpins the modern liberal constitutional
form. There can be no constituent effort, nor liberation from capitalist
violence outside of a radical critique of private property rights. The act
of the commons social movement engaging in the practices and
production of alternative property configurations moves crucial steps in
the direction of defeating the corporate agenda. A social movement of
the "many worlds," the many sites of societal constitutionalism of the
commons, linked together in a global network, could provide us with a
truly bottom-up constitutional and deliberative process capable of
reversing the progressive transfer from the commons to the private on
local, national, and global levels, giving renewed relevance to the
concepts of "constituent power" and "popular sovereignty" today.

